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Reservation Wages - Measurement and 
Determinants: Evidence from the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain (KMP) 






This paper investigates the difficulties in measuring reservation wages, models 
the determinants of reservation wages, and compares reservation wages with 
predicted wages. Data is drawn from the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain (KMP) 
survey. Certain factors (e.g. education, labour market status, household income 
and duration of unemployment) are significant in explaining variation in 
reservation wages. Importantly, a person’s position in the labour market is not 
as a result of his/her reservation wage. Rather, reservation wages are a function 
of his/her labour market status: while those in wage-employment report a 
reservation wage based more on perceived labour market value, those in 
unemployment report a reservation wage influenced strongly by subsistence 
requirements. This study concludes that voluntary unemployment does not exist 
in KMP, with people in general reporting reservation wages well below what 





The depth of poverty and inequality faced in South Africa is amongst the worst 
in the world, with about 24 million South Africans, out of a total population of 
45 million, living below the poverty line
1 (McCord, 2002). Numerous studies 
(e.g. Leibbrandt, Bhorat & Woolard (2001), Nattrass & Seekings (2001) and van 
der Berg & Bhorat (1999)) have shown that there is a strong link between 
poverty, inequality and the labour market in South Africa. In particular the 
availability and level of wage income in the household determines the 
household’s position in the income distribution. Although evidence has shown 
that the level of wage income determines the probability of a household being in 
poverty or not, a more important and crucial factor is the presence of a wage 
                                                           
1 Here the poverty line is calculated on the basis of household consumption expenditure of 
R800 or less per month in 1996 prices.  
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earner in a household. Leibbrandt, Bhorat and Woolard (2001:81) have shown 
that 76.1% of those people who live in poverty are in households that have no 
formal sector wage earners. Given that even low paying jobs can have a 
substantial impact on alleviating poverty, one would expect people living in an 
area of high unemployment and related economic hardship, to accept almost any 
job opportunity.  
 
However, looking at the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain (KMP) survey of 2000 
(Centre for Social Science Research, 2000), where respondents responded to 
questions concerning hypothetical job offers, about 15% of the sample refused 
the offers. These jobs offered wages realistic to KMP and adjacent areas at the 
time of the survey. How could people refuse jobs given the high levels of 
unemployment and the lack of job opportunities, especially for those with few 
skills? How could they refuse offers in light of the evidence showing that a 
household’s position in the income distribution is strongly influenced by the 
availability of wage income? Perhaps people do have a reservation wage even in 
the presence of large unemployment and poverty. Perhaps certain individuals are 
choosing to remain voluntarily unemployed. Perhaps reservation wage 
information still matters in dictating labour supply and participation decisions in 
South Africa and KMP more specifically.  
 
Using data from the KMP survey, this paper will explore reservation wages. The 
survey was developed with a special focus on labour market issues and covered 
the magisterial district of Mitchell’s Plain, which includes the African townships 
of Khayelitsha, Gugulethu and Langa. As noted in Nattrass (2002) it is not a 
representative sample of the Cape Town metropolitan area but of predominantly 
working class Africans and Coloureds. The households that were sampled had to 
answer both a household level questionnaire and an adult questionnaire
2. The 
household questionnaire was used to establish a household roster with the usual 
questions on age, gender and relationships in the household (Centre for Social 
Science Research, 2003). The adult questionnaire was administered to all those 
above the age of 18 in the household and was divided into sections measuring 
aspects from a respondent’s level of education to their unemployment and 
employment histories etc. One section (section K) was designed specifically to 
measure a respondent’s reservation wage, i.e. to establish the lowest wage at 
which the person would work.  
 
The aims of this paper are to understand the complexities in measuring 
reservation wages using data from the KMP survey. Through regression 
                                                           
2 See http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/cssr/dfrusas.html#kmp for a copy of the household and adult 
questionnaire.  
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analysis, the paper will probe what factors (individual, household, situational 
etc.) influence a person’s reservation wage in KMP. An understanding of the 
determinants of reservation wages should help predict and explain changes in 
labour supply. This paper also looks at the relationship between a respondent’s 
predicted wage and his/her reservation wage in an attempt to distinguish groups 
of people whose reservation wage is excessive relative to what they could earn 
given their characteristics.  
 
Section 2 begins with a discussion of what constitutes an individual’s 
reservation wage. Included in this discussion is a theoretical overview of 
different value functions that pertain to different labour market states. These 
value functions will provide guidance as to what factors are likely to impact on a 
person’s reservation wage.  
 
Section 3 probes the important question of whether economic behaviour follows 
reported reservation wages. Much of this discussion will focus on work done 
internationally as there has been little work done in this regard in South Africa. 
Much of the South African work has been concerned with the problems in 
measuring reservation wages through surveys, as will be discussed.  
 
Section 4 looks carefully at the questions used in the KMP survey and probes 
how reliably they measure reservation wages. Has this survey managed to 
overcome the problems of other surveys? Can the measured reservation wages 
be considered reliable and consistent? Is economic behaviour consistent with 
these reservation wages? 
 
Section 5 uses regression analysis to probe what factors determine a person’s 
reservation wage. The discussion begins by looking at the model specification 
and includes a description of the explanatory variables used in light of the value 
functions described in section 2 and the analysis in section 4. 
 
Section 6 compares respondents predicted and reservation wages to assess 
whether there is an argument for the existence of large-scale “voluntary” 
unemployment in KMP. Predicted wages are estimated using the Heckman 
maximum likelihood method. A probit analysis is then conducted to analyse 
what groups of people are most likely to have a reservation wage higher than 
their predicted wage (i.e. overly optimistic wage expectations).  
 





2. Reservation Wages 
 
Killingsworth (1983) defines a person’s reservation wage as the highest wage at 
which he/she will not work. More formally, it is the slope of the budget line 
tangent to the individual’s utility function, when all of his/her time is dedicated 
to leisure activities (for a complete discussion of this see Killingsworth, 1983).  
Thus if the wage drops below this level, changes in the wage will not change 
behaviour. If the wage increases above this level then the person will enter the 
labour market. At his or her reservation wage a person is indifferent between 
work and leisure. However, if a person’s property income (other income derived 
from sources that are unrelated to work) rises or falls, so does their reservation 
wage. Killingsworth (1983:8) notes that, “other things being equal, people with 
less property income cannot ‘afford’ to be choosy about working and will have 
to be prepared to work for a lower wage.” 
 
In terms of the KMP survey, a person’s reservation wage is the point at which 
he/she will participate in any form of wage-employment assuming they were 
unemployed at the time. Thus knowing each person’s reservation wage, one will 
better understand labour supply in KMP. As the point at which people 
participate in the labour market is their reservation wage, knowing the 
determinants of reservation wages one will be able to predict and interpret 
changes in labour supply. Other sources of income affect the reservation wage 
but so will the shape and position of the particular utility function, which is a 
portrayal of the individual’s work/leisure trade-off. As discussed below, the 
value people derive from being in different labour market states determines the 
interaction between their non-wage income and their work/leisure trade-off.  
 
Following Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993), it is assumed that prior to searching 
for a job, an individual decides on the minimum acceptable wage that he/she 
will work for. If this minimum acceptable wage is higher than the value of the 
income associated with the individual’s present situation then he/she begins the 
process of search and only stops once a wage offer equal to or greater than the 
reservation wage is found. Thus, reservation wages are an important component 
of the search theory model that describes an individual’s process of looking for a 
job. People formulate their reservation wage by taking into account a 
comparison of different value functions which describe the present discounted 
value of expected net benefits associated with being in different states in the 
labour market. 
 
Sapsford & Tzannatos note that “it is frequently assumed that the individual, 
having accepted this offer, remains in employment forever, in which case it is  
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convenient to interpret the wage offer as the discounted present value of the 
lifetime earnings from the job in question” (1993:339). In an area like KMP, 
people will probably have short time horizons given the high unemployment and 
unpredictable nature of employment duration. In addition people in KMP are not 
able to move freely between states when they wish due to the shortage of 
available jobs. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to model their value functions 
in a dynamic way where they discount the present value of being in a particular 
state. Rather the value of each state will be analysed in a static sense, where only 
the current value is measured. For example, the value of being employed as 
opposed to being unemployed and searching for work or being unemployed and 
not searching for work. 
 
Following Dinkelman & Pirouz (2001:2) these value functions can be 
represented as follows: 
 
1.   Vj   = value of taking a job offer 
    = W(j) – C(j)  
 
W(j) is the after tax wage rate from the job. C(j) are the costs related to 
the job, which may include transport to work and the costs of putting 
children in childcare. For the purposes of this paper these costs are 
assumed to be the same for everyone in KMP
3. 
 
2.   Vsu   = value of search unemployment  
    = B(s) – C(s) 
 
Where B(s) are the expected benefits of search and C(s) are the costs of
 search. 
Moving beyond Dinkelman and Pirouz
4, the benefits of search are equal
 to: 
B(s)   = [(Pj)(E[wj])/x] + bsu 
 
Where Pj is the individual’s probability of finding a job and E[wj] is the expected 
wage in that job, both dependant on x, the individual’s characteristics (e.g. 
gender, age, race, education level etc.). Pj is also dependent on the 
                                                           
3 In practice these costs are probably greater for women, as they are expected to look after 
the children. 
4 The specification of benefits of search, as presented in Dinkelman & Pirouz (2001), have 
been changed here, to reflect that an individual’s probability of finding a job and the expected 
wage rate are both dependant on x, a vector of the individuals characteristics. In Dinkelman 
& Pirouz (2001) the probability of an individual finding work is not shown to be dependant on 
x.   
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macroeconomic climate and the preference of employers for labour. bsu  is the 
amount of non-work (property) income available in searching unemployment 
depending on what resources the individual and household can draw on. These 
resources may include old-age pensions, the child welfare grant and other state 
transfers. 
 
Costs of search, C(s), will equal the sum of the cost associated with each 
search method pursued. This will include transport costs, agency costs, 
media costs and the opportunity costs of queuing and waiting. Once again, 
for the purposes of this paper it is assumed that these costs are the same 
for each individual in KMP. 
 
3.   Vo,i   = value of being out of the labour force in state i 
    = B(o,i) – C(o,i)  
 
Where, for example, B(o,i) could be the benefits from being out of the 
labour force as a house worker, student, retired individual, or other
5. For a 
student these benefits would include the value of an improved 
qualification plus any other non-work (property) income that the 
individual or individual’s household is able to draw on.   
 
C(o,i) are the related costs of state i, which would include the opportunity 
costs of not searching for a job. These opportunity costs would vary 
depending on how the individual would be expected to fare in the labour 
market given their individual characteristics (x) and the expected value 
and probability of them finding a job. 
 
When an individual sets a reservation wage it is an indication of his/her 
formulated value functions and at what point he/she will move from being out of 
the labour force or in search unemployment and into formal employment. This 
movement would happen when Vj exceeds both Vsu and Vo,i.  
 
Value functions are useful in that they indicate what factors are likely to impact 
on the reservation wage. Using value functions provides a framework for 
narrowing the list of explanatory variables used in the regression analysis in 
section 5. As the purpose of this paper is to understand the determinants of a 
person’s reservation wage in KMP, before they receive any job offers, the costs 
C(j) are irrelevant. Due to the lack of specific information regarding the costs 
C(s) and C(o,i), these costs are assumed to be the same for all people living in 
                                                           
5 Dinkelman & Pirouz (2001) indicate, following a suggestion from Wittenberg (1999), that 
‘other’ might involve criminal activities or individuals not doing anything with their time.  
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KMP and are also irrelevant for this study
6. C(o,i) also includes the opportunity 
costs of not searching which are related to the individual’s probability and 
expected value of getting a job. However, as [(Pj)(E[wj])/x] improves so will the 
value of being in searching unemployment, which will lead to a rise in the 
reservation wage. As a result the person would move into searching 
unemployment. Thus, B(s) and B(o,i) are relevant in determining a persons 
reservation wage. This will be further explored in section 5 when the 
explanatory variables in the regression analysis are specified. 
 
 
3. Measuring Reservation Wages 
 
The notion of a reservation wage is simple conceptually, but difficult to measure 
in practice. Do real people actually have reservation wages, and if so, what 
affects them? Other equally pertinent questions include:  
 
•  Do people report reservation wages that are consistent with the 
economist’s theoretical understanding of a reservation wage?  
•  Do people understand what a reservation wage is?  
•  In reporting their reservation wage, what assumptions are people taking 
into account?  
•  How closely is a person’s present reservation wage related to his or her 
wage history?  
•  What causes a person’s reservation wage to change? 
•  Most importantly, is an individual’s economic behaviour consistent with 
his/her reported reservation wage, for example with regard to labour 
market participation and refusal or acceptance of job offers?  
 
The discussion in this section begins by looking at some important international 
literature. Much of this work has been done in an environment that does not 
have the extremely high unemployment rates and poverty experienced in South 
Africa. As a result, caution must be exercised in drawing inference for the South 
African context.  
 
The discussion will then look at work done in South Africa specifically 
regarding the measurement of reservation wages. Most of this work is based on 
two surveys that have attempted to measure reservation wages, the SALDRU 
                                                           
6 It is accepted that households have different numbers of children, which may impact 
differently on individual value functions and thus on their reservation wage. However, as 
discussed in Appendix B, the variable number of children adds no significance in explaining 
variation in reservation wages.  
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(South African Labour and Development Research Unit) 1993 survey 
(SALDRU93) and the October Household Survey of 1994 (OHS94). In 
concluding, solutions will be offered to help improve future surveys of 
reservation wages in South Africa. Section 4 analyses the usefulness of the KMP 
data against this backdrop. 
 
 
3.1 International Work 
 
In an early econometric analysis of reservation wages, Lancaster and Chesher 
(1983) found that respondents, in their sample of British unemployed people, 
were able to answer questions on reservation wages. In addition, individuals 
reported reservation wages that were “numerically consistent” with optimal job 
search theory, where only 3 respondents of the sample of 642 reported an 
expected wage of less than the reservation wage. The expected wage in this 
instance is what the respondents reported when asked what wage they expected 
to earn. 
 
Jones (1988) investigated the relationship between reservation wages and a 
person’s duration of unemployment. Using data on unemployed individuals in 
Great Britain, he found a positive relationship, where reservation wages “play a 
significant” role in the determination of unemployment duration. This finding is 
in line with the theory of stationary job search, which asserts that, given other 
characteristics, an individual who has been unemployed for some time is likely 
to have a higher reservation wage than someone who has been unemployed for a 
shorter time. This is because no wage offer high enough has been made to 
induce the longer unemployed person into the labour force. From this evidence 
Jones (1988) concludes that the unemployed do act in accordance with their 
stated reservation wage when evaluating prospective job offers. Furthermore, 
Jones states that there is “considerable precedent in the economics literature for 
viewing such responses [to reservation wage questions] as indicative of labour 
market behaviour” (1988:749).  
 
However, Jones (1988) does make note of a problem associated with his results 
and why they may not be applicable in a wider context. An important point is 
the effect of unemployment benefits on a person’s reservation wage. In a 
country where the unemployment benefits are exhaustible or non-existent, a 
person’s reservation wage may decline as the duration of unemployment 
persists. In Britain this would not have been so critical at the time of the study 
when unemployment benefits were not exhaustible. In South Africa this may be  
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a problem given the inadequate provision of unemployment benefits
7. A person 
may have a reservation wage to begin with and may act in accordance with this 
wage in evaluating job offers. As the duration of unemployment persists and the 
related hardships of unemployment intensify (Leibbrandt, Bhorat & Woolard 
(2001), Nattrass & Seekings (2001) and van der Berg & Bhorat (1999)) so may 
this reservation wage decline or economic behaviour deviate from this stated 
reservation wage. As a result a person’s reservation wage in one time period 
may not be an accurate predictor of economic behaviour with regards to labour 
supply in another time period. 
 
Particular studies in periods of high unemployment have produced mixed 
results. As discussed in Jones (1988): Holzer (1985) finds the reported 
reservation wages to be a reasonable reflection of economic behaviour, whereas 
Moylan, Millar and Davies (1984) found inconsistencies with men accepting 
offers below their reported reservation wages. Testing the erosion of an 
individual’s reservation wage or his/her inconsistent behaviour as 
unemployment persists will only be possible when reliable panel data exists in 
South Africa. However, to a limited extent, the KMP survey offers the 
possibility of assessing this
8. 
 
Gorter and Gorter (1993), using data derived from the Dutch Socio-economic 
panel of 1985-87, conclude that the job offer arrival rate is more important than 
the unemployment benefit and reservation wage in ending a search spell. They 
highlight that the personal productivity of the searcher will affect the job offer 
arrival rate. This finding is rather vague and inconclusive. Does the productivity 
of the searcher not influence his/her B(s) (as specified in equation 2 in section 2) 
which impacts on his/her reservation wage - as discussed in section 2 when 
looking at value functions? If this is true then the reservation wage in turn 
affects the offers that are accepted or rejected. Thus, the reservation wage is 
important in determining the length of search duration (i.e. economic behaviour) 
because it reflects the underlying perceived productivity of an individual and 
how earnestly they are prepared to wait for an appropriate offer.    
 
Prasad (2000) uses consecutive reservation wage observations and accepted 
wages that can be compared to reservation wages from previous years, from the 
German socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) study, to examine whether reservation 
wage data resemble a relationship to actual economic behaviour.  The strength 
                                                           
7 The UIF (Unemployment Insurance Fund) provides 26 weeks of income for those workers 
that contributed to the fund, but less than 2% of workers are actually covered (Nattrass & 
Seekings, 2001). 
8 See section 4.2 and section 5. In section 5 a variable measuring unemployment duration is 
included as one of the explanatory variables of an individual’s reservation wage.  
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of this study is that it uses panel data, which accurately shows how a person’s 
reservation wage changes over time in relation to the wage offers accepted. By 
computing the differential between the accepted wage at time (t + 1) and the 
reservation wage at time (t) and plotting this as a percentage of the reservation 
wage, Prasad (2000) shows that the majority of results cluster around zero. This 
strongly suggests that there is a relationship between reservation wage data and 
economic behaviour.  
 
Recent work by Boheim (2002) has looked at whether the reported reservation 
wage is an indicator of a persons ‘true’ reservation wage - ‘true’ reservation 
wage being the minimum wage that an individual would accept to participate in 
the labour market. Boheim (2002:18) concludes that, “men’s reported 
reservation wages are an indicator of their “true” reservation wage.” For women 
the outcome is not as indicative, but Boheim (2002) notes that the number of 
women in the sample is low, which may influence the results.   
 
In Boheim’s paper, reference is made to work done by Dawes (1993) and a 
study he conducted on long-term British unemployment. Dawes (1993) 
concluded that reported reservation wages could be misleading, as responses to 
reservation wage questions can “indicate subsistence requirements rather than 
self perceived labour market value” (2002:2). Although Boheim (2002) criticises 
the Dawes study for using a particular sample of unemployed individuals, where 
the conclusions may not be true for the population as a whole, it is important to 
keep these points in mind when analysing reservation wage data for South 
Africa. With the high levels of poverty and unemployment in South Africa, 
individuals may be strongly influenced to report reservation wages that indicate 
subsistence requirements rather than self-perceived labour market worth. The 
findings in section 5 support Dawes’s argument by showing a distinction 
between the reservation wage of those in wage-employment and the reservation 
wage of the unemployed. The evidence seems to indicate that those in wage-
employment report reservation wages that reflect their perceived labour market 
value, whereas the unemployed tend to consider subsistence requirements when 
reporting their reservation wage. Dawes refers to reported reservation wages that 
consider subsistence requirements as misleading. This is not the case as long as 
one is aware of this. There is important information to be garnered from 
reservation wages that reflect subsistence requirements.   
 
In summary, the international work seems to support the notion that reported 
reservation wages are a good predictor of economic behaviour but concern still 
arises over the high levels of unemployment in South Africa and how this may 
distort economic behaviour. For example, a person may report a particular 
reservation wage in time t, but as their duration of unemployment lengthens,  
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their reservation wage will fall (see section 5). Given this fall the person’s 
economic behaviour in time t+1 will reflect the reduced reservation wage and 
not the reported reservation wage from time t.  This erosion of the reservation 
wage will only be testable when panel data exists. 
 
 
3.2 South African Work 
 
Surveys that have attempted to measure an individual’s reservation wage in 
South Africa include the SALDRU93 survey, the OHS94 and the KMP survey 
used in this study. A major limiting factor of these surveys is that they are once 
off and thus no assessment can be made of how an individual’s reservation wage 
changes over time. It is also not possible to compare the reported reservation 
wage to the wage histories of the respondents (although the KMP survey tries to 
an extent to amend this) and as a result it is difficult to ascertain how reliably the 
reservation wages predict economic behaviour. Nonetheless, for the purpose at 
hand, the KMP survey provides good information for trying to understand what 
factors impact on a person’s reservation wage. In addition, the KMP survey 
measures the wages of those who are presently employed, as well as the wage 
offers refused and provides information on hypothetical jobs where respondents 
were asked if they would accept the job or not at a specified wage. Section 4.2 
uses this information to test the reliability of the reported reservation wage from 
the KMP survey.   Table 1 lists the questions from the SALDRU93 and OHS94 
surveys pertaining to reservation wages.  
 
Table 1. Measuring reservation wages in the SALDRU93 & OHS94 
surveys 
 
SURVEY SECTION  QU.  #   
SALDRU93
9 8.1  12  What is the lowest wage in rand per day that 
…name… would accept for a casual or day job?   
   13  What is the lowest wage in rand per month that 
…name… would accept for a permanent job? 
OHS94
10 3  3.31 
What is the minimum salary or wage …name… 
is prepared to work for? 
IMPORTANT: Specify per 
day/week/month/year 
1 = day, 2 = week, 3 = month and 4 = year 
 
                                                           
9 Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 1993 
10 Central Statistical Service, 1995  
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Before moving on to discuss work that has used the results from the surveys, it 
is worth commenting on the omissions and inconsistencies in the questions in 
table 1. The questions do not specify how many hours a respondent would be 
expected to work or how far from their residence the hypothetical job would be. 
The questions say nothing of related benefits that the jobs may or may not offer. 
At least the SALDRU93 survey makes a distinction between casual and 
permanent work – which can have importance in assessing how job security is 
valued. This is not made clear in the OHS94 question. 
 
Kingdon and Knight (2001) assess the difference between reservation wages and 
predicted wages as a possible route to understanding the nature of 
unemployment in South Africa using data from the SALDRU93 and OHS94 
surveys. From the SALDRU93 survey, question 13 (see table 1) is used as the 
measure of a person’s reservation wage. Kingdon and Knight point out that 
question 12 is not used, as it seems less reliable. Their reasoning is that by 
“standardising the reported daily reservation wage figure to the month by 
multiplying the daily rate by 25 gave an average monthly reservation wage for 
casual jobs that was 45% higher than the reported monthly wage for a 
permanent job” (2001:10). This reasoning fails to include the possibility that 
respondents were taking job security into account when reporting reservation 
wages for permanent employment and as a result were willing to accept lower 
wages. As a result the answers are possibly not less reliable but include more 
information than is noted. 
 
As both surveys failed to ask questions for past wages or wage offers rejected, 
Kingdon and Knight generated predicted wages for the unemployed individuals 
using parameters from the wage functions of employed persons. Kingdon and 
Knight’s (2001) results show that about 50% of the unemployed have a 
reservation wage that exceeds their predicted wage and for about 30% of the 
unemployed, this reservation wage exceeds the predicted wage by more than 
40%. More specifically: African respondents, people from rural homelands, low-
educated workers, females, the young and persons who have never worked 
before have a noticeably higher mean reservation wage ratio (reservation wage/ 
predicted wage). One may conclude that for the majority of the unemployed 
they are not reporting their reservation wage and would be prepared to work for 
less given their predicted wage. Thus, using this reservation wage to understand 
economic behaviour would be flawed. However the reliability of the reservation 
wage measure has to be questioned.  
 
Kingdon and Knight (2001) list numerous reasons why they suspect the reported 
reservation wages to be unreliable. One problem is that survey questions on 
reservation wages are often not specific enough and are open to wide  
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interpretation. The questions in the SALDRU and OHS surveys failed to specify 
the expected hours of work per week or month and also the distance to work 
(see table 1). In labour-force surveys, there is no such thing as a single ‘going 
wage’ because such a wage depends on the job and the skills characteristics of 
the individual concerned. Secondly, people often report a fair wage and not 
necessarily the minimum they would accept in the formal sector. Thirdly, often 
people (especially in deep rural areas) lack information about the labour market 
and are unable to value themselves correctly given the level of skills they 
possess. They also lack education and previous work experience, which causes 
them to be ignorant about their market worth. Fourthly, when asked about their 
reservation wage people may adopt a bargaining stance since this is the usual 
context in which they discuss wages. Thus, the wage they report is the one they 
would normally start bargaining with and is above their minimum acceptable 
wage.  
 
In addition, Jones (1988) discusses the notion that respondents may be 
concerned about the confidentiality of the survey and as a result have little 
incentive to report honest answers. Finally, people may report a wage they 
expect to receive in an area other than where they presently reside. This is often 
the case with people living in rural areas, who aspire to find work in urban areas. 
Kingdon and Knight find that these measuring problems contribute to the 
situation where the “reported reservation wage often exceeds the predicted 
wage” (2001:14). 
 
In trying to improve the reliability of recording reported reservation wages, Dias 
offers the following suggestion of how to formulate a survey question: 
 
“If a full-time job is offered to …name… nearby (within 5 kilometres of your 
residence) would …name…accept it if the weekly rate were: (with a range of 
income categories having been provided)?” (2000:18) 
 
Furthermore, Dias suggests that the interviewer “read each salary or wage 
bracket starting from the lowest and identify the first wage or salary bracket that 
the respondent would be willing to accept” (2000:18). Hopefully this will 
prevent respondents from assuming a bargaining position when reporting their 
reservation wage and identify the lowest wage that an individual would be 
prepared to work for. As noted earlier with question 12 and 13 from the 
SALDRU93 survey, Dias suggests that a question should be asked pertaining to 
the minimum wage that a respondent would accept for doing a casual job. This 
will help shed light on the extent to which “job security can be traded for 
income” (2000:18). Included in the survey should be questions on past wages or 
past wage offers rejected. As Dias puts it, “past wages earned may well form a  
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reasonable benchmark for wage expectations while past wage offers rejected 
may substantiate the reservation wage reported” (2000:18).  
 
Dias has offered positive suggestions, although when specifying “full-time” in 
the question this should be backed up with a precise definition of what it means. 
How many hours and how many days per week is one expected to work? Does 
this include other benefits etc.? By specifying that the job is within 5 kilometres 
of the respondent’s residence, this will hopefully reduce the problem of rural 
respondents reporting wages they expect to get in an urban environment. 
 
 
4. Reservation Wages in KMP 
 
Having reviewed particular work in South Africa on measuring reservation 
wages and being aware of the problems encountered and suggested solutions, 
the discussion will now focus on how reservation wages were measured in KMP 






In the KMP survey, direct information pertaining to a respondent’s reservation 
wage is asked in six separate places. Table 2 lists the associated questions. 
 
Before analysing the questions individually, it is important to note that they all 
specify a “take-home” wage or, in other words, the wage once any deductions 
have been made (e.g. tax deductions). Thus, in later sections where comparisons 
are made it will be important to convert all previous wages, refused wages and 
hypothetical wages to take-home wages making the necessary tax adjustments.  
 
Respondents who stated that they are not currently wage or self-employed, and 
who want a job, would have answered questions F24 and F25. The phrasing of 
questions F24 and F25 are quite different which will help explain the associated 
difference in their means with question F24 having a mean response of over 
R1500 and question F25 a mean response of about R950 - a difference of more 
than R550.   
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Table 2.  Questions in the KMP survey pertaining to reservation wages 
 
Question 






What do you think would be a reasonable 
take-home monthly wage for you given your 
desired hours of work and your age, 
education, skills, and area of residence etc. 
1100 1533 
F25 
What is the absolute minimum take-home 
monthly wage below which you would not be 
prepared to work in any job (taking into 
account your desired hours of work)? 
1099  958  
(800) 
G29  What is the absolute lowest weekly take-
home wage you would accept if offered a job? 208 2656 
I5  What is the lowest daily take-home wage you 
would be prepared to accept for a casual job?  1241 2319 
I18  What is the lowest daily take-home wage you 
would be prepared to accept for a casual job?  353 2930 
K5 
What is the absolute lowest monthly take 
home wage that you would accept for any 
work (if you were unemployed at the time)? 
2267  1159  
(1000) 
    Note: Numbers in brackets are the median response to the associated question. 
 
Question F24 seems more likely to be probing what an individual thinks a fair 
wage would be and not the minimum he/she would be prepared to work for. 
Question F25 on the other hand seeks to uncover a person’s absolute reservation 
wage – asking the wage below which a person “would not be prepared to work.” 
Without further information, one may conclude that an individual’s reservation 
wage is approximately two-thirds of what he/she would report as a fair wage.    
 
Respondents who have engaged in non-wage income-earning activities (self-
employment) in the last six months would have answered question G29. 
Question G29 is trying to probe the minimum wage that an individual would 
need to be paid to move from self-employment into more formal wage-
employment. The mean wage of over R2600 has been calculated by converting 
the reported mean weekly take-home wage to a monthly take-home wage
12. This 
                                                           
11 The calculated mean monthly reservation wage has not been adjusted in any way for 
outliers, which may have resulted from recording or other errors. 
 
12 From a discussion with Dudley Horner (Deputy Director SALDRU) on the 16 May 2003, it 
was agreed that for the purposes of this paper: all daily wages would be multiplied by 21.75, 
all weekly wages would be multiplied by 4.33 and all fortnightly wages would be multiplied by 
2.17 to estimate a monthly wage respectively. To derive 21.75: 104 (number of weekend 
days in year) is subtracted from 365 (number of days in a year). This result, 261, is then  
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mean is far higher than that from questions F24 or F25, indicating that the 
unemployed are more desperate for work, possibly as they are less employable 
and have lower property income on which to depend. To try and understand why 
the G29 mean is so much higher, the means of self-employed gross income, 
money left for salaries and take-home profit were calculated as shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Means of selected self-employment income  
 
Type of Income  Mean (rands/month) 
Gross income/Total income earned  984 
Money for own salary  634 
Take-home profit  580 
Reservation Wage  2656 
 
Initially it was hypothesised that a self-employed person’s reservation wage, to 
be drawn from self-employment into formal wage-employment, would be 
related to what he/she earns in self-employment. The idea being that the formal 
wage compensates at least for what is earned in self-employment. Table 3 shows 
that this is the case but much more than expected. The mean reservation wage of 
over R2600 is far higher than even the mean gross income earned in a month. 
Perhaps, just compensating a self-employed individual for the loss of income is 
not enough, and that the loss of freedom to control one's own business/time plus 
the loss of enjoyment and satisfaction from running a business etc. has to be 
included in the compensation. 
 
Question I5 would have been answered by people who have not done casual 
work in the six months prior to the survey and who would like to do casual 
work. Most of these respondents (68%) are classified as broadly or marginally 
unemployed, with the difference being made up by those respondents in wage-
employment or self-employment who would like a few days of casual work. The 
mean reservation wage (adjusted to a monthly wage) for casual work in this 
instance is about R2319. Comparing this to the mean from question F25 (R958) 
shows the extent to which job security, offered by a permanent monthly job, is 
valued. Respondents have to be paid a lot more to do casual work in order to 
compensate for the lack of job security offered by a casual job and the days 
waiting to find the job.  
 
Question I18 is the same as I5 except that only those people who have done 
casual work in the six months prior to the survey answered it. Of this group, 
fewer respondents (53%) are classified as broadly or marginally unemployed 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
divided by 12, giving 21.75 working days in a month. In similar fashion there are 4.33 weeks 
in a month (52/12) and 2.17 (26/12) fortnights in a month.  
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compared to those who answered I5, which explains the higher mean reservation 
wage of over R2900 (adjusted to a monthly wage). Once again this indicates the 
greater desperation amongst the unemployed to find work, given the lower mean 
reservation wage in I5. 
 
The final question that seeks to probe a person’s reservation wage is K5, which 
is a question within the reservation wage section of the survey. As can be seen 
by the number of observations, almost the entire sample answered this question, 
including those in wage-employment who were told to assume they were 
unemployed at the time. Once again it asks for the “absolute lowest monthly 
take home wage” but is different from F25 in that it asks the minimum a person 
would “accept”, as opposed to the minimum “below” which he/she would not be 
prepared to work. This subtle difference in the question is important, as 
discussed in Nattrass (2002), as 64% of the respondents who answered both 
these questions gave a different reservation wage. Either the different phrasing 
of the questions causes the difference in reservation wage, or people do not have 
a specific reservation wage, or are rather vague about the concept.  
 
Table 4. Comparisons of the difference between responses to question 
K5 & F25 
 





Of the respondents who answered both questions K5 and F25, table 4 shows the 
percentage who reported the same reservation wage for both questions, a higher 
reservation wage in K5 than F25 and a lower reservation wage in K5 than F25. 
It is interesting that 42% of the respondents reported a higher reservation wage 
in K5 than F25. One could argue that the difference in wording between the 
questions is important in explaining this result. The fact that F25 asks the 
minimum below which people would not be prepared to work as opposed to K5 
asking the minimum people would accept, seems to encourage a lower positive 
response. Note should be made of this for phrasing of reservation wage 
questions in future surveys. 
 
Taking the entire sample of respondents who answered K5, one can see that the 
mean reservation wage is R1159 and the median R1000. This is higher than the 
mean (R958) and median (R800) for question F25, as question K5 includes 
respondents who are unemployed as well as respondents who are in some form 
of employment. The mean for K5 is lower than the mean for F24, reinforcing the  
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idea that question F24 is measuring the respondent’s notion of a “fair wage” as 
opposed to a reservation wage. Taking only those respondents who are currently 
in wage-employment increases the mean of K5 to R1374, reinforcing the notion 
that the employed report a higher reservation wage than the unemployed.  
 
The simple analysis in this section shows that people in different labour market 
states report different reservation wages. Furthermore individuals want 
increased compensation for casual work where there is a lack of job security. As 
this paper seeks to understand what determines reservation wages of those 
entering wage employment and given the above analysis, F25 and K5 are the 
likely measures that could be considered as the dependant variable in the 
regression analysis in section 5. To keep the analysis as all-inclusive as possible, 
K5 will be used as the reservation wage measure. Different dummy variables 
will be inserted for the different labour market states that individuals may be in 
and to test how these states impact on their reservation wage. Using work done 
by Nattrass (2002), individuals will be classified according to one of the 
following states
13: Wage-employed, Self-employed, Casual-employed, Active-
searching Unemployed, Exclusively Network-searching Unemployed, 
Marginalised Unemployed or Non-labour Force Participants.  
 
 
4.2 A Closer Evaluation of the Reservation Wage 
Measure 
 
Having decided to use K5 as the reservation wage measure, a brief assessment 
of the question is in order, to see how it fares in light of the discussion in section 
3. Does it overcome the problems suggested by Kingdon and Knight (2001) and 
does it include some of the suggestions offered by Dias (2000)?  
 
The first glaring problem with K5 is that it does not specify the hours that a 
person would be expected to work in order to earn the “lowest monthly take-
home wage.” It does not specify the distance to work, but as the survey is in the 
Cape Town metropolitan area with good transportation links this may not be as 
big a problem as suggested by Kingdon and Knight (2001). The problem with 
not specifying distance to work is when rural respondents report a wage they 
expect to earn in an urban area. A further problem with K5 is that it does not 
                                                           
13 If people did more than one of the mentioned jobs then they were classified according to 
the job, which absorbed the greatest amount of their time or provided the greatest income.  
The narrow definition of unemployment would normally include only those who are classified 
as active-searching unemployed.  The broad definition of unemployment would include those 
who are active searching, exclusively network-searching and the marginalised unemployed. 
For a more detailed and extended discussion of the classification see Nattrass (2002).   
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specify benefits associated with the job in question. For example, it is important 
to instruct the respondents that the job has no related benefits and in so doing 
help standardise their responses. This will be especially important when asking 
employed people their reservation wage if unemployed, as they may be in jobs 
with benefits and take these similar benefits into account when reporting their 
reservation wage. Removing the possibility of benefits may cause the employed 
to have a higher reservation wage. Further qualitative research is necessary to 
uncover how benefits affect one’s reservation wage.  
 
Dias (2000) suggests that income categories be read to respondents when asking 
them the lowest wage they would be prepared to accept. This suggestion would 
be beneficial when a question on reservation wages is asked in a completely 
random place in a survey. Here though, K5 is asked at the end of a section where 
hypothetical jobs, offering wages realistic to the KMP area at the time of the 
survey, have been discussed. As a result the respondents’ minds will already be 
accustomed to thinking about jobs at different wages and will find it easier to 
answer question K5. They will be unlikely to adopt a bargaining stance or report 
a fair wage in answering K5, given that question K5 comes after a number of 
hypothetical job offers where the response is simply yes or no. In addition, they 
will not feel pressure suddenly to think about their reservation wage or to feel 
that they are being asked this question with no understanding of where the 
response is leading. 
 
A major criticism thus far has been the lack of panel data to support studies on 
reservation wages in South Africa – as no assessment can be made of pre or post 
survey wage offers refused or accepted. The KMP survey goes a long way 
towards alleviating the limitation engendered by the fact that it is a once off 
study, by gathering information on wage histories, wage offers rejected and the 
inclusion of hypothetical job offers. In section 4.3 the paper probes how well or 
consistently a respondent’s economic behaviour is following his/her reported 
reservation wage. Is K5 really measuring a person’s reservation wage in KMP? 
 
 
4.3 Does Economic Behaviour Support the Reported 
Reservation Wage? 
 
If the respondent’s reservation wage is their actual reservation wage, this will be 
termed a ‘consistent reservation wage’. When looking at the consistency of the 
reservation wage, a person’s economic behaviour in relation to the reservation 
wage needs to be analysed. If people accept jobs above their reservation wage  
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and refuse jobs below their reservation wage then they are showing consistent 
behaviour. Showing consistent behaviour is a sign that the reported reservation 
wage may well be the respondent’s actual reservation wage.  
 
From the KMP survey there are three ways to assess whether the reported 
reservation wage is in fact the person’s actual reservation wage. The first option 
is to look at those respondents who are presently working, and to compare their 
current wage with their reservation wage if they were hypothetically 
unemployed. The second option is to look at those who are unemployed and 
who have refused jobs, comparing the wage offer refused to their reservation 
wage. This analysis is limited in that only 39 respondents refused jobs, of whom, 
only 27 gave useable information on the wage offer refused. The final option is 
to use the information from section K of the questionnaire where respondents 
were asked to consider whether they would accept certain jobs at a stated wage 
if they were unemployed at the time. These jobs and the wages on offer were 
realistic to KMP at the time of the survey. 
 
Current Wage (Wage-employed) vs. Reservation Wage 
(Wage- employed)  
 
For those classified as being in wage-employment, it was possible to construct a 
monthly after tax wage for 753 respondents
14. Of these 753 respondents, 647 
answered question K5 and reported their reservation wage if unemployed at the 
time. Table 5 below shows the mean monthly wage and reservation wage for 
this group. 
 
Table 5. Means of Current Wage and Reported Reservation Wage for 
Wage Earners 
 
  Obs Mean  (rands/month) 
After Tax Monthly Wage   753  1720 
Reported Reservation Wage   647  1319 
 
From table 5 it can be seen that the mean reservation wage is below the mean 
after tax monthly wage. Thus in general, working people are reporting 
reservation wages below their current wage, which is a sign that the economic 
behaviour of those who are employed is consistent with their reservation wage 
(i.e. they have accepted jobs where the wage offered is higher than their 
                                                           
14 A large proportion of the 753 reported a monthly after-tax wage. The rest reported a daily, 
weekly or fortnightly after-tax wage – the necessary adjustments were made to convert these 
to monthly wages. This monthly wage measure is used in section 6 when trying to estimate a 
predicted wage.   
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reservation wage). To test this consistency further, the mean of the difference 
between the after tax monthly wage and reported reservation wage was 
calculated. The result of R389 further indicates that in general people are 
reporting reservation wages below that of their current wage. This simple 
analysis suggests that in general respondents are reporting their reservation wage 
and acting accordingly in their economic behaviour.  
 
 
Wage Offers Refused vs. Reservation Wage




16 asks respondents if they have turned down job offers, during the 
time they have wanted work (as probed in question F10). 39 respondents refused 
jobs but of these only 27 reported useable information on the wage offer refused. 
Information for these 27 is displayed in table 6. Before proceeding with any 
analysis it is noted that 27 is a very small sample from which to make any 
significant conclusions. However, for lack of other information, it is still useful 
to look at the job offers refused in light of the respondents’ reservation wages.  
 
In table 6, the final column headed ‘Diff’, is the calculated difference between 
the respondent’s reservation wage and his or her real after-tax monthly wage 
refused. A calculated difference that is negative (these numbers have been 
bolded) shows inconsistent behaviour on the part of the respondent, as he/she 
has refused a job offer with a wage higher than their reservation wage.  
 
Of the 27 respondents listed, 10 (37%) show inconsistent behaviour. Three of 
these 10 respondents (numbers 8, 14 and 26) gave the reason for not accepting  
the job as “quarrelled with management”, “family duties” and “job too far 
away” respectively. For these 3 respondents, even though their reservation wage 
is below the wage offered, their reasons for not accepting the jobs suggests they 
were prevented from taking the job even if they would have liked to work. Thus 
their behaviour cannot be termed inconsistent.   The reasons given by the other 7 
do not preclude them from displaying inconsistent behaviour. If their reported 
reservation wage was their actual reservation wage they would not give the 
following reasons for refusing the jobs – “did not like job”, “wage too low” and 
“below skill level.” 
 
                                                           
15 The analysis in this section follows work done by Nattrass (2002). The difference is that all 
respondents who reported they had refused work during the time period they had wanted 
work are included. Nattrass only selects those who are defined as broadly unemployed. 
16 A question in the unemployment history section of the questionnaire.  
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1 -  1800 Construction  Other    1210  590 
2  Search-un  2500  Construction  Wage too low  440  2060 
3 Search-un  800 Sales  Below  skill  level  660  140 
4 Wage-emp  1200 Prison  warder  Did not like job  3140  -1940 
5 Search-un  1500 Cleaner  Other  660  840 
6 -  250 Cleaner  Wage too low  330  -80 
7 Search-un  1000 Domestic  worker Cost of travel too high  968  32 
8 Netsearch-un  600 Cook  Quarrel with manage  1712  -1112 
9  Search-un  1000  Restaurant  Did not like job  660  340 
10  Search-un  1000  Domestic worker  Wage too low  266  734 
11 Search-un  1300 Domestic  worker Did not like job  1452  -152 
12 Search-un  1200 Newspaper  Below skill level  1400  -200 
13 Search-un  1000 Construction  Below  skill  level  770  230 
14 Netsearch-un  600  Domestic  worker Family duties  1320  -720 
15  Marg-un  1200  Restaurant  Cost of travel too high  350  850 
16 Marg-un  500  Construction  Did not like job  1210  -710 
17  Search-un  1800  Restaurant  Wage too low  1400  400 
18  Search-un  1000  Domestic worker  Did not like job  800  200 
19  Search-un  300  Domestic worker  Did not like job  220  80 
20  Search-un  1800  Clerical  Wage too low  1318  482 
21  Marg-un  1500  Sales  Wage too low  440  1060 
22  Search-un  1000  Restaurant  Wage too low  800  200 
23 Search-un  500  Welding  Wage too low  600  -100 
24  Marg-un  1000  Baby sitting  Family duties  500  500 
25  Search-un  1200  Other  Wage too low  660  540 
26 Search-un  300  Sales  Job too far away  800  -500 
27 Marg-un  1200 Domestic  worker Wage too low  1449  -249 
 
Note: 
1.  In line with Nattrass (2002), real monthly wage offers refused were calculated on the assumption 
of 10% inflation per annum. 
2.  Only two of the above respondents reported a wage offer before-tax. One was R3500 a month 
before-tax and the other R900 a month before-tax. According to the Budget Review 2000 
(Department of Finance, 2000:81) the offer of R900 a month would not be taxed whereas the 
R3500 would fall into the 35001-45000 per annum tax-bracket. The necessary adjustment has 
been made. 
3.  Daily wages, weekly wages and fortnightly wages were converted to monthly wages using the 
formula discussed in section 4.1. 
 
These reasons indicate that they actively took the decision to refuse the job and 
were not prevented from taking it. Thus, their reported reservation wage is not 
the lowest wage they would accept for any job, given they are unemployed at 
the time.   
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Taking the above discussion into account, only 26% (7 of 27) show inconsistent 
behaviour. Once again this indicates that the majority of respondents are 
refusing jobs consistent with their stated reservation wage. 
 
 
Comparing hypothetical jobs with the Reservation Wage 
 
Section K of the questionnaire deals specifically with reservation wages. In this 
section respondents are given the option of four hypothetical jobs that were 
realistic to areas adjacent to KMP at the time of the survey. The respondents 
were asked to respond either “yes” or “no” as to whether they would accept the 
jobs, at the specified wage rate, if they were unemployed at the time. Table 7 
lists the exact questions. 
 
Once again, the consistency of the respondents’ reservation wages are to be 
analysed by assessing the responses to the questions in table 7. No comparison 
will be made between the results from question K2 and the reservation wage 
because K2 offers a casual job, whereas the reservation wage is for a permanent 
monthly job. Not understanding exactly how job security is traded for income 
will make this comparison difficult. 
 
Table 7. Hypothetical job offers 
 
Question Number  Question 
K2 
If a government public works programme came to the area (perhaps to cut 
Port Jackson trees on the sand dunes or the mountain) offering R33 a day, 
would you take a few days work if you were unemployed at the time? 
Imagine that an industrial park opened up nearby. Would you accept any 
of the following jobs at the following (pre-tax) rates of pay (if you were 
unemployed at the time): 
K4.1  A cleaner with a monthly wage of R1081? 
K4.2  A general worker with a monthly wage of R1438? 
K4 
K4.3 A  machine  operator with a monthly wage of R1619? 
 
Note: Question K4 refers to pre-tax rates of pay. No tax adjustment needs to be made for any 
of the jobs, as the wages earned are too low to be included in any of the taxable brackets. The 
tax threshold being R21 111 per year, according to the Budget Review of 2000 (Department 
of Finance, 2000:81). However, for future surveys, it would be worthwhile to inform 
respondents of the tax threshold, so that the true take-home value of the job can be judged. 
 
Three new variables were generated that equalled the monthly take-home wage 
offered in questions K4.1 to K4.3. For each respondent, the difference between 
their reported reservation wage and these variables was calculated
17. The 
                                                           
17 For example, if the reservation wage were R2000, then the difference (K5 – K4.1) between 
the reservation wage and a cleaner’s monthly wage would be R919.   
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analysis in this section calculates the percentage of respondents whose responses 
were consistent and probes inconsistencies. 
 
The decision rule, in analysing the consistency of the reservation wage, was 
based on four simple criteria:  
 
Firstly, the reservation wage is termed “consistent” if the calculated difference is 
positive and the respondent refused the associated job or if the calculated 
difference is negative and the respondent accepted the associated job. For 
example if the difference is positive, then the respondent’s reservation wage is 
higher than the offered wage. To be consistent the respondent would have to 
refuse this job as it offers a wage below the respondent’s reservation wage.  
 
Secondly, the reservation wage is termed “inconsistent” if the calculated 
difference is positive and the respondent accepts the associated job or if the 
calculated difference is negative and the respondent refuses the associated job. 
For example if the difference is positive, then the respondent’s reservation wage 
is higher than the offered wage. If this job were accepted then the behaviour is 
inconsistent as the respondent is accepting a job where the offered wage is 
below his/her reservation wage.    
 
As shown in table 7: the job offer in K4.1 is a cleaner with a monthly wage of 
R1081, the job offer in K4.2 is a general worker with a monthly wage of R1438 
and the job offer in K4.3 is a machine operator with a monthly wage of R1619. 
Table 8 lists the consistency between the respondents’ reported reservation 
wages and their acceptance or refusal of the three jobs. 
 
Table 8. Reservation Wage and cleaner, general worker and machine 
operator job offers 
 
Percentage of Respondents 
Decision Rule 




Consistent: res>wage offer and refusal  12%  8%  7% 
Consistent: res <wage offer and acceptance  58%  66%  62% 
Inconsistent: res>wage offer and acceptance  23%  19%  21% 
Inconsistent: res<wage offer and refusal  6%  7%  10% 
 
The first notable feature of the results is that roughly 70% of the respondents are 
showing consistency between their reservation wage and the acceptance or 
refusal of the three jobs. Secondly, the majority of inconsistency lies with 
respondents accepting the jobs at wage offers below their reservation wage. This  
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may reflect the seriousness of unemployment in the area and the desperation to 
find work, but also that respondent’s are not taking the high levels of 
unemployment into account when reporting their reservation wage. Only when 
presented with an offer are we able to gauge a person’s true reservation wage. 
Thirdly, only a very small percentage of the respondents are actually refusing 
jobs where their reservation wage is below the wage offered. Inconsistency in 
this respect may reflect a person’s taste for work or preference for employment 
given the nature of the job. Further investigation showed that about 44% of the 
respondents who refused the cleaner job where the wage offer was above their 
reservation wage (inconsistent behaviour) are classified as non-labour force 
participants. In this regard it is difficult to term their behaviour as being 
inconsistent. In fact by refusing the job they are being consistent with their 
present labour market position where they may for example still be studying or 
too old to work.  
 
The question posed at the beginning of this section 4.3, is whether the economic 
behaviour of respondents supported their reported reservation wage. The 
purpose in trying to answer this question is to probe whether respondents are in 
fact reporting the minimum wage they would accept. As has been shown, the 
mean wage earned by those in wage employment is substantially higher than 
their mean reported reservation wage. For those who have refused jobs, the 
majority (about 74%) have refused job offers where the wage is below their 
reservation wage. Finally, in analysing the responses to the hypothetical job 
offers one can safely conclude that the majority of respondents (about 70%) are 
being consistent in accepting or refusing jobs with a monthly wage given their 
reservation wage.  
 
One can conclude from these results, that in general, K5 is a good measure of a 
person’s reservation wage and needs no adjustment for the regression analysis. 
Section 5 will probe what factors determine the variation in reservation wages 
across KMP.    
 
 
5. Determinants of Reservation Wages in KMP 
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will form the basis of the analysis of 
what factors impact on an individual’s reservation wage. The regression 
equations will take the following form: 
 
log(res wage) = c + β1X1 + β2X2 +… βiXi + ε 
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The dependant variable will be the log of the individual’s reservation wage and 
the explanatory variables (Xi) will be drawn from a list of variables as discussed 
in Section 5.1. 
  
Only those respondents who are between the ages of 18 and 65 are included in 
the regression analysis. Furthermore, of the respondents classified as non-labour 
force participants, all those who mentioned being too old or too sick are not 
included as they are not able to function effectively in employment, even if they 
wanted to. Non-labour force participants who are still within the economically 
active age and gave reasons such as ‘still in school’, ‘rather not work’, ‘prefer 
leisure’ etc. are still included as they may accept a job if the ‘correct’ wage is 
offered. In terms of racial breakdown only Coloureds and Africans are 
compared, as there are too few respondents of other race. 
 
 
5.1 Discussion of Variables
18 
 
As shown in Appendix A, most of the reservation wages are clustered around 
R1000 per month. At the top end, three observations were dropped from the 
analysis as they were considered outliers and may affect the regression results
19. 
At the bottom end, no outliers were considered for investigation as they are all 
within two standard deviations of the mean.   
 
The reservation wage and three measures of income (as discussed further on) 
were adjusted by taking the log of these variables. This adjustment is necessary 
to control for any scale effects resulting from the wide variation in these 
variables compared to other variables, as shown in table 9. The standard 
deviation of the reservation wages is R755, far greater than the variation in any 
of the other continuous explanatory variables. In addition, a number of the 
explanatory variables are categorical. Using the log of the reservation wage, as 
opposed to the reported reservation wage will produce better results and 
estimates of relationships that may exist, as the variation in reservation wage 
will be reduced and extreme values will have less of an impact. 
 
In section 2 the importance of non-wage (property) income in affecting a 
person’s reservation wage was highlighted. The theory is that those people who 
have higher non-wage income can afford to survive in unemployment for longer 
and will therefore have a higher reservation wage. This can be tested using data 
                                                           
18 Appendix B offers a discussion of explanatory variables that were considered, but not used 
in this study. They may however be applicable in other studies.  
19 Included in Appendix A is a discussion of the treatment of outliers.  
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collected by the KMP survey.  The measure of household income (hhold 
income) that is used has been compiled by aggregating the individual incomes 
for each household (wage, self, casual, grant, remittance income etc. - see 
Skordis and Welch (2002) for a complete discussion
20) instead of using the 
reported household income from the household level questionnaire. The reason 
for this is twofold: 
 
Firstly, Skordis and Welch (2002) find that household income estimates tend to 
be higher and have greater variation when formulated by aggregating individual 
income estimates as compared to the household income measure from the 
household level questionnaire. Thus, the household level questionnaire may not 
be measuring household income correctly.  
 




  Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Reservation Wage (rands)  2011  1165.8  755.4  10  7000 
ln(Reservation Wage)  2011  6.87  0.7  2.3  8.9 
Age (years)  2217  34.1  11.7  18  80 
Numploy 2217  0.9  0.8  0  2 
Education   2182  8.6  3.3  0  15 
Hhold Income (rands)  1884  3399.3  4528.9  5  60500 
ln(Hhold Income)  1884  7.3  1.5  1.6  11 
Net Hhold Income  1857  2063.5  3448.5  0  33300 
ln(Net Hhold Income)  1857  5.7  3  0  10.4 
Contr Hhold Income  1857  1362.9  2813.9  0  37600 
ln(Contr Hhold Inc)  1857  3.7  3.7  0  10.5 
Duration of unemp (months)  1025  43.2  50.4  1  376 
 
Secondly, having an aggregated measure of household income, it will be easy to 
dis-aggregate and determine how separate components affect a household 
member’s reservation wage. For example, to see whether changes in wage 
income in the household are more significant in explaining changes in the 
respondent’s reservation wage than say changes in household income earned via 
casual work. The hypothesis being that any changes in wage income would be 
more serious in terms of future income security than changes in casual income. 
 
This is similar to work done by Klasen and Woolard where they try and assess 
whether pension and private incomes “constitute a direct disincentive to search 
                                                           
20 In compiling the household income measure, the gross wage earned by each individual 
was used instead of a net wage, as there was better and more information at a gross level.   
21 Adjusted sample used in regression analysis.  
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by raising the reservation wage” (2000:18). In their study they find that pension 
and remittance incomes do not appear to raise reservation wages and only self-
employment income and private income is associated with higher reservation 
wages.  
 
In addition, the effects of two further measures of household income will be 
tested in the regression analysis when including only those respondents in wage-
employment. The first is household income minus the contribution of the 
particular respondent to household income (net hhold income) and the second 
is the contribution of the respondent to household income (contr hhold 
income). As noted earlier, the log of these household income measures will be 
used to control for the wide variation in these variables as shown in table 9. 
 
As discussed in section 2 a person’s reservation wage in KMP will be affected 
by the benefits of being searching-unemployed (B(s)) and/or the benefits from 
being out of the labour force in state i (B(o,i)). B(o,i) will include non-wage 
(property) income as discussed but also such things as an improved 
qualification, spending greater time in leisure or with ones children etc. This list 
could be quite extensive with many factors that are not easily measurable (i.e. 
the value of leisure time for each respondent). For the purpose at hand, 
education and number of children have been identified as important 
explanatory variables. A variable was created that measured the number of 
children under the age of 16 in the household but as discussed in Appendix B 
was not a significant predictor of the reservation wage. However, education is an 
important explanatory variable and will be discussed further on. 
 
B(s) is made up of the sum of [(Pj)(E[wj])/x] and bsu as discussed in section 2. 
bsu includes the non-wage (property) income that a person can rely on in 
unemployment. The importance of B(s) lies in the impact of the expected value 
and probability of getting a job on one’s reservation wage. As specified, Pj and 
E[wj] are dependent on x - the individual’s characteristics. In terms of value 
functions, certain x characteristics will improve a person’s chance of getting a 
job or raise their expected wage. As a result, the value for them of searching will 
be higher and they will have a higher reservation wage than someone who does 
not share these favourable characteristics. The purpose of the regression analysis 
is to break these two steps into one and instead of looking at how Pj and E[wj] 
affect the reservation wage, rather how certain characteristics directly impact on 
a person’s reservation wage.  
  
Klasen and Woolard (2000) find that age, gender, race and education have a 
large and significant impact on reservation wages. Table 10 shows the mean 
reservation wage for different age categories in KMP increasing as one moves  
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from the 18-22 category up to the 40-49 category. After the 40-49 category the 
mean declines slightly, indicating a peak in a person’s reservation wage 
somewhere in mid-career (40-49). This peak will be tested in the regression 
analysis by the use of an age-squared variable.  The mean reservation wage of 
males (R1301) is higher than that of females (R1072). The mean reservation 
wage of Africans (R1045) is far lower than that of Coloureds (R1470). 
 
Table 10. Mean reservation wage across different variables (in rands)
22 
 
  Obs Mean  Median 
K5   2011  1166  1000 
18-22 371  1056  1000 
23-29 509  1113  1000 
30-39 558  1193  1000 
40-49 362  1270  1000 
Age Categories 
50-64 211  1237  1000 
Male 822  1301  1000  Gender 
Female 1189  1072  1000 
African 1457  1045  1000  Race 
Coloured 542  1470  1200 
Married 770  1297  1000  Marital Status 
Unmarried 1175  1068  1000 
Head of hhold  737  1265  1000  Position in household 
Not the hhold head  1266  1111  1000 
Worked before  500  1060  1000  Work Experience (Unemployed) 
Never Worked  430  936  800 
6 months or less  155  1158  1000 
Btw 6 and 12 months  185  957  900 
Btw 12 and 24 months  190  934  900 
Btw 24 and 48 months  198  991  1000 
Btw 48 and 96 months  138  922  825 
Duration of Unemployment 
More than 8 years  118  1096  1000 
Wage-emp 747  1355  1000 
Self-emp 168  1214  1000 
Casual-emp 64  1024  1000 
Search-unemp 431  1066  1000 
Network Search-unemp  168  957  825 
Marginalised-unemp 331  944  900 
Labour Market Status  
Non-labour force parts  102  1272  1000 
Zero 695  1026  1000 
One 860  1193  1000  No. of other wage-employed in 
hhold  
Two or more  456  1328  1000 
Rural   1018  1028  800  Place of Birth 
Urban   915  1295  1000 
                                                           
22 Adjusted sample used in regression analysis.  
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Table 10. Mean reservation wage across different variables (in rands) 
continued…. 
  Obs Mean  Median 
0-Std5 625  1040  1000 
0-Std5+ 39  1385  1000 
Secondary 782  1095  1000 
Secondary+ 133  1411  1000 
Matric 232  1269  1000 
Matric+ 156  1542  1200 
Education Categories  
University 13  1877  1500 
Very Positive  344  1011  1000 
Positive 216  1102  1000 
Neither Pos nor Dis  91  1017  900 
Disheartened 85  890  800 
Expectations on getting a job  
Very Disheartened  120  1043  1000 
Presently Saving  1011  1239  1000  Savings Behaviour  
Not Saving  1000  1091  1000 
 
In coding the education variable, a year of education was assigned for each year 
of school completed. If a person finished matric they were assigned 12, for 12 
years of education completed. Years of post-school education completed were 
added in addition to schooling. Of the respondents, 601 indicated that they had 
done some form of post-school education, of which 410 had completed their 
studies. The respondents who had not completed their post-school studies 
received no extra years of education.  
 
The KMP questionnaire offers numerous post-school study options, ranging 
from training courses for the unemployed to a university qualification. In order 
to add extra years for post-schooling, an assessment was made of the mean time 
it took the group of people who had completed a certain course or diploma to 
finish. This was possible as the questionnaire asked each respondent if they had 
completed their studies, the age they began, and the age they finished. Table 11 
shows the mean time in years that it took for people to complete their respective 
courses, diplomas or degrees. 
 
Table 11. Mean time in years to complete courses, diplomas or degrees 
 
  Obs  Mean time to 
complete (yrs)
Years assigned to 
post-school educ 
Training course for unemployed  24  0.96  1 
Training course at work  61  1.49  1 
Trade certificates  53  0.91  1 
Technikon/Technical training/Diploma 101  2.03  2 
University 17  3.47  3  
  31
According to the means in table 11, years of post-school education completed 
were assigned, as per column 3. Table 10 shows how the mean reservation wage 
increases substantially as years of education completed rises. For those who are 
in the category of having completed zero years of education to standard 5, the 
mean reservation wage is R1040. For those who have completed university the 
mean reservation wage is R1877.  
 
Prasad (2000:46) finds that those who are married tend to have a lower 
reservation wage and that the status of household head “exerts a positive effect 
on the reservation wage.” Table 10 shows (opposite to Prasad’s findings) that 
the mean reservation wage of those who are married (R1297) is higher than the 
mean reservation wage of those who are unmarried (R1068). This difference 
may be better explained by the impact of age. More than 80% of those who are 
married are between 30 and 64 years of age (when reported reservation wages 
are highest), as opposed to 60% of those who are unmarried being below the age 
of 30. Controlling for age the regression analysis will be able to test this. The 
mean reservation wage of household heads (R1265) is higher than the mean 




Prasad’s (2000) regression results show that the number of other employed 
persons in the household is a significant determinant of the reservation wage. 
Table 10 supports this finding in showing that the mean reservation wage of 
those households with two or more employed persons (R1328) is the highest 
compared to the mean reservation wage of households with 1 or zero other 
employed persons. Number of other employed people can be a further measure 
of financial security (linking to the discussion of property income) and/or affect 
the probability of a respondent getting a job, thereby influencing a person’s 
reservation wage. 
 
Jones (1988) found that people with higher reservation wages have longer 
periods of unemployment  duration as they can afford to stay unemployed 
longer until a better job offer is received. In this case a person can control the 
decision to accept a job via evaluating different job opportunities. In KMP the 
causality we are trying to measure is the opposite. The lack of jobs means that 
unemployed people do not have control over their employment prospects and 
need to wait until they are ‘lucky’ enough to find employment. The hypothesis 
being that the longer a person remains unemployed, the lower his/her reservation 
                                                           
23 Regardless of the model specification, the regression results (not shown) do not find any 
significant difference between household heads and other household members in explaining 
variation in reservation wages. Often the signs were different given the results from table 10.   
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wage falls as a result of human capital loss and an increased desperation to find 
work. Prasad points out that “one would expect the reservation wage to decline 
over time on account of wealth effects and human capital depreciation” 
(2000:45). Standing mentions sociological research that has shown how 
“prolonged unemployment reduces a worker’s employability, morale, and 
capacity for work” (1978:233). In Holzer’s (1985) study on reservation wages 
and their effect on the labour market outcomes of black and white youth he 
notes that, particularly for black youth, as their unemployment duration 
lengthens so too do their reservation wages decline. The mean duration of 
unemployment in KMP is about 43 months (see table 9). Table 10 shows a 
decline in the mean reservation wage, as duration of unemployment increases, 
from R1158 for those who have been unemployed for less than 6 months to 
R922 for those who have been unemployed between 48 and 96 months.   
 
Standing claims that migrants “are likely to have less knowledge of prevailing 
urban wage rates and, possibly with fewer income-sharing contacts on whom to 
rely, a greater need for an income from work, however small” (1978:233). In 
terms of the specified value functions, a person from a rural area may have a 
lower probability of securing employment (lack of contacts, urban labour market 
experience etc.) and as a result a lower reservation wage. With this in mind, a 
person’s  background may provide strong explanatory power in describing 
variation in the reservation wage. Place of birth is chosen to proxy for a 
respondents background. Table 10 shows that those born in an urban area have a 
higher mean reservation wage (R1295) than those born in a rural area (R1028). 
This supports the idea that people from a rural area may have migrated to KMP 
in search of work, are more desperate to secure employment and will thus 
participate at a lower wage.  
 
A factor that may significantly affect the probability and expected value of 
someone getting a job in KMP, and thus their reservation wage, is their level of 
work experience. Potential experience is usually proxied by the formula: Age – 
Years of Education – 6. With the disjointed employment histories in KMP and 
the high levels of unemployment this does not seem a viable way to measure 
work experience. Keswell and Poswell (2002:12) use ‘age’ instead of ‘potential 
experience’ in their paper on returns to education, as “grade repetition, low 
educational attainment, and job insecurity (problems which typify South Africa) 
will likely produce overestimates of the effect of potential experience.” The 
effect of age is already included but to measure work experience more directly a 
dummy variable (work) was created to distinguish between those who have 
worked before from those who have never had a job. One would expect there to 
be a difference (amongst the unemployed) between the reservation wage of 
those who’ve worked before and those who haven’t. Those who have worked  
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may have a better idea of their labour market value and report a reservation 
wage in line with this. On one hand those who have never worked may have 
unrealistic wage expectations and report higher reservation wages, as evidenced 
by Kingdon and Knight (2001). Alternatively, those who have never worked 
may acknowledge they have less experience and expect to earn a lower wage 
than those who have worked and thus have a lower reservation wage. This is 
supported marginally in table 10 where the mean and median reservation wage 
of the group who have worked before (R1060 & R1000) is higher than the mean 
and median reservation wage of the group who have never worked (R936 & 
R800).  
 
The discussion in section 4 highlighted the importance of labour market status 
in affecting a person’s reservation wage. As discussed, using the classifications 
developed by Nattrass (2002) for KMP, dummy variables will be inserted into 
the regression analysis to test whether there is significant difference between the 
reservation wages of people with different labour market classifications. Table 
10 shows evidence that there is a difference with those in wage-employment 
having the highest mean reservation wage (R1355). It is interesting to note that 
for the unemployed categories, the highest mean reservation wage is for those 
who are searching unemployed (R1066), declines for those who are network 
searching unemployed (R957) and is lowest for those who are Marginalised 
(R944). Thus, on average those who are actively looking for work have a higher 
reservation wage than those who are marginalised and not even trying to find a 
job. Finally, non-labour force participants have a higher than average mean 
reservation wage of R1272 – indicating a stronger desire to remain out of wage 
employment.  
 
Finally, the KMP survey tried to collect information on a person’s expectation 
towards getting a job. This is likely to be affected by labour market status, as 
those who are marginally unemployed are likely to be more discouraged than 
those who are searching unemployed. The KMP survey asks those who are 
unemployed “…how long you think it will be before you get a job.” From this 
question
24 each respondent was classified as being either very positive, positive, 
                                                           
24 Question F17 was used in order to test how expectation towards getting a job affected a 
respondent’s reservation wage. The question read, "We now want to ask you how long you 
think it will be before you get a job." If the respondent felt that they had a realistic possibility 
of getting a job within the next month they were classified as "very positive." If the 
respondent felt that they had a realistic possibility of getting a job within the next three 
months they were classified as "positive." If the respondent felt that they had a realistic 
possibility of getting a job within the next six months they were classified as "neither positive 
nor disheartened." If the respondent felt that they had a realistic possibility of getting a job 
within the next year they were classified as "disheartened." If the respondent felt that they  
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neither positive nor disheartened, disheartened or very disheartened about their 
prospects for getting a job. Table 10 shows no clear pattern in the mean 
reservation wage for each category from very positive to very disheartened 
however the medians seem to decline as the attitude towards getting a job 




Regression 1, listed in table 12, includes respondents from all labour force 
classifications. The explanatory variables are age, numploy (number of other 
wage-employed persons in the household), educ (highest education level 
completed), gen (gender), race and married and are all significant at the 1% 
level. The regression however has an R-squared value of 0.1463, thus only 
14.63% of variation in the reservation wage is being explained by the included 
explanatory variables. As a result much of the variation in the reservation wage 
is still unexplained. This is a weakness of all the regressions in table 12 and 
especially those regressions where only the unemployed are included.  In these 
regressions the R-squared is around 0.09 - only 9% of the variation is explained! 
An obvious reason for the low R-squared is that other significant determinants 
of reservation wages have not been captured.  
 
However, the low R-squared is not necessarily a cause for concern given that R-
squared’s are typically low in cross sectional analysis. It would be highly 
unrealistic to expect a high proportion of the variation in the reservation wage to 
be explained with our limited understanding, at this stage, of what impacts on 
reservation wages. The interest in using regression analysis is to see how the 
listed explanatory variables (from discussion in section 5.1) impact on a 
person’s reservation wage controlling for other effects - rather than trying to 
specify a model with the greatest explanatory power (but with less analytical 
vigour). As research on reservation wages is deepened, more of this variation in 
the reservation wage will hopefully be explained as further determinants are 
discovered and introduced. Already it is interesting to note that when only a 
regression is specified for those classified as ‘marginalised unemployed’ and the 
variable ‘work’ is included, the explained variation in the reservation wage 
doubles. Elsewhere ‘work’ had little explanatory power but suddenly becomes 
significant as an explanatory variable. What does this mean? This will be 
discussed further on.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
had no realistic possibility of getting a job within the next year they were classified as "very 
disheartened."  
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Returning to the regression 1, a brief discussion of the coefficients is in order. 
The coefficient on ‘age’ is positive and shows that as people grow one year 
older, their reservation wage on average increases by about 0.7%, controlling for 
other factors. This supports earlier evidence from table 10 where the mean 
reservation wage increased up until the 40 to 49 age category and declined 
slightly thereafter. An age-squared variable was introduced to test a possible 
quadratic relationship between age and reservation wage. The age-squared 
variable turned out insignificant and showed no evidence that reservation wages 
seem to peak in middle age. 
 
The coefficient on ‘numploy’ is positive and indicates that for each additional 
employed person in the household a person’s reservation wage increases by 
about 5.5%. There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, household 
income is directly related to the number of employed people in the household. 
Extra employed people mean greater household income. As a result, households 
with extra employed people have more income to support those who are 
unemployed and offer greater income security to those in unemployment, thus 
allowing unemployed individuals to have a higher reservation wage. Secondly, 
higher numbers of employed people in the household may indicate that the 
prospects of an unemployed person finding a job are increased. This idea links 
in with evidence presented by Kingdon and Knight from a 1995 survey of 
employers that showed how “41% of firms relied on friends and relatives of 
existing workers for their recruitment” (2000:8). The greater the number of 
employed people within a household, the better the network for the unemployed 
person to find a job. With better networks comes a higher reservation wage, as 
the unemployed expect to get a better job more quickly.  
 
However ‘numploy’ becomes insignificant in regression 4 where labour market 
status is included, regression 5 where only wage-employed people are included 
and regression 8 where only the unemployed are included. ‘Numploy’ is not 
significant in regression 4 as there is evidence that ‘numploy’ is correlated with 
labour market status. Labour market status is a significant predictor of the 
number of wage-employed people in a household. The insignificance of 
‘numploy’ in regression 5 is not surprising, especially given regression 6 
showing how a wage-employed person only takes their contribution into account 
when reporting their reservation wage (as will be discussed further).  
 
However for regression 8 where only the unemployed are included, it is 
surprising that ‘numploy’ is insignificant especially when regression 9 shows the 
significance of household income in influencing a person’s reservation wage. 
For the unemployed one would expect the number of employed members in the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































both the ability to survive and the possibility of finding a job. Looking at the 
data it is clear that there is not equal variability in the ‘numploy’ variable for the 
unemployed group, with more than half of the unemployed people coming from 
households with no other person in wage-employment. This lack of variability 
may be a reason for the insignificance of ‘numploy’ in regression 8. However, 
one must not discount the possibility that other household members in wage-
employment do not signify any form of job security. With such variable 
employment histories in KMP, one can safely assume that employment duration 
is probably highly variable. With this in mind, people may put little faith in an 
employed person being able to support them. Perhaps the significance of 
household income in explaining reservation wage variation in regression 9 is 
due to grant and other income and not to wage income from employed people in 
the household. Further analysis (i.e. disaggregating the household income 
measure) is inconclusive but on average the contribution of wage income is 
about 75% of household income. As a result one can assume that wage income 
is a major contributor to the significance of household income. 
 
The coefficient on ‘educ’ is positive as expected and indicates that for each year 
of education completed a person’s reservation wage rises by 3.8%.  
 
The coefficient on ‘gen’ is positive and indicates that on average males have 
reservation wages about 23% higher than females. This differential stays 
relatively constant through all the regressions, dropping slightly when the 
regressions are restricted to unemployed people. An explanation for this drop is 
that controlling for household income and duration of unemployment reduces 
the effect of gender on a person’s reservation wage. The important question to 
ask though is why are males’ reservation wages higher than those of females? 
One argument is that culture and society impact on the earning role that males 
are supposed to fill. The expectation to be the breadwinner causes males to have 
higher reservation wages on average than females. Alternatively, 52% of males 
and 34% of females are in wage-employment, whereas 38% of males and 53% 
of females are classified as broadly unemployed. Thus part of the gender 
reservation wage differential may be explained by the dominance of males in 
wage-employment and the dominance of females in unemployment. Regression 
4 controls for labour market status and the gender coefficient is only slightly 
lower but as significant. 
 
The coefficient on ‘race’ is also relatively constant through different model 
specifications, with Coloureds having a reported reservation wage on average of 
32% higher than Africans. This racial differential of the reservation wage may 
be a further legacy of Apartheid where Africans were paid the least for 
comparable jobs and as a result are still prepared to work for less.   
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Finally, the coefficient on ‘married’ shows that on average a married person 
has a reservation wage of 8% higher than a non-married person, supporting the 
evidence from table 10. One may have expected the coefficient to be negative 
(as found by Prasad (2000)), in that married people have more than themselves 
to look after and desperately need a job, thus being prepared to work for less. 
However, a positive coefficient suggests the opposite - that having more people 
to support, a married person is expected to earn more and thus has a higher 
reservation wage.  
 
In regression 2 the education variable is dropped and replaced by dummy 
variables indicating different education categories. The positive relationship 
between education and reservation wage is once again apparent, however, 
looking at categories one is able to explore how the magnitude of reservation 
wages change as people complete different phases of education. One noticeable 
feature is that having any form of post-school education (even a training course 
for the unemployed) causes a person’s reservation wage to increase quite 
considerably. Those who have zero schooling to standard 5, but have some form 
of post-school education, have a 19% higher reservation wage on average than 
the base; whereas those who have completed standard 6 to 9 have a 12% higher 
reservation wage on average
25 than the base. Thus although the first group has 
not reached high school, but has done some form of post-school training, they 
have a higher reservation wage than the group which has completed a portion of 
high school. Looking at the matric variables this is also true. A person who has 
completed matric and has done further education has a reservation wage of 42% 
higher on average than the base, compared to 30% higher on average for those 
with matric and no further qualifications.  Completion of university increases a 
person’s reservation wage by about 69% on average above the base.  
 
The interesting question to ask is why people’s reservation wages increase 
substantially when they have even a little bit of post-school education
26? There 
are two possible answers. Firstly, Keswell and Poswell (2002) show that the 
returns to education in South Africa are convex in nature. People may be aware 
of the better reward for someone with training beyond school and expect to be 
paid more than a person with comparable schooling but no extra training. 
Secondly, people may have expended income in gaining the extra training and in 
turn expect to be rewarded for making this outlay. As a result they have higher 
reservation wages than those with only schooling. 
                                                           
25 It is noted that the coefficient for the 0-5+ variable is only significant at the 10% level 
whereas the coefficient for the 6-9 variable is significant at the 1% level. 
26 Post-school education could be a proxy for work experience. However, this finding still 
holds when controlling for work experience (not shown in table 12) through the use of the 
dummy variable ‘work.’   
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Regression 3.1 and 3.2 introduces a person’s background into the model through 
‘urban’ - a variable that measures a person’s place of birth. As race and 
background are well correlated, with 96% of coloureds coming from an urban 
area and 70% of Africans from a rural area, race is dropped in order to see the 
effect of background on a person’s reservation wage. Regression 3.2 supports 
the findings from table 10, with the coefficient on the urban variable showing 
that a person born in an urban area has an 18% higher reservation wage on 
average than someone born in a rural area. However this conclusion must be 
cautioned, as background is insignificant when controlling for race in regression 
3.1.  
 
Regression 4 introduces labour market status into the analysis. The first 
notable finding is that there are not statistically significant differences between 
the reservation wages of those who are self-employed, casual-employed and 
non-labour force participants and those in wage-employment. In analysing the 
self-employed group more closely
27, there is evidence that half of the group is 
what one could term survivalists and the other half entrepreneurs. Survivalists 
are those people who have turned to self-employment, not because they have a 
good idea or like running their own business, but because of the lack of formal 
sector jobs and the desperation to survive. On the other hand entrepreneurs are 
those who prefer running their own business to working in formal wage-
employment. The mean reservation wage for the survivalist group is R965, 
whereas the mean reservation wage for the entrepreneurial group is R1368. 
Using a dummy variable that broke the self-employed group into survivalists 
and entrepreneurs showed no significant difference in the reservation wage of 
the survivalists from the entrepreneurs under any model specification. 
 
In regression 4 the difference in reservation wage between labour market states 
starts becoming significant when looking at those who are unemployed. If we 
assume that as you move from searching unemployed to network-searching 
unemployed to marginalised unemployed, people are becoming more 
discouraged
28 about their prospects of finding a job, then there is a good 
relationship between expectations of finding a job and the reservation wage. As 
people become more discouraged their reservation wage declines from being 
                                                           
27 Question G28 in the KMP survey asks those who have indicated that they are in self-
employment, “If you were offered a job with the same wage as your present profit, would you 
take the job? (Assume that you would work the same number of hours for the wage as you 
do now for profit).” If people answered yes to this question they could be considered 
survivalists and if they answered no then they could be termed entrepreneurs. 
28 Searching unemployed and network-searching unemployed tend to use networks to find 
jobs, however the searching unemployed are also actively going out to look for jobs. On 
these grounds, it is assumed that the searching unemployed are more positive about their 
prospects of finding a job.  
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8.6% less for the searching unemployed
29 to 17.2% less for the marginalised 
unemployed.   
 
As discussed in section 3, Dawes (1993) suggested that in some instances 
reservation wages might be an indication of subsistence requirements rather than 
self-perceived labour market value. Evidence of this is clear when comparing 
the wage-employed with the unemployed.  
 
Including only those in wage-employment in the regression analysis, the 
coefficient on the education variable rises to 0.05 as shown in regression 5. 
Comparing this to regression 8, which includes only the unemployed, the 
education coefficient drops to 0.029. Furthermore, when breaking the education 
variable into categories and assessing the difference in coefficients between 
regression 7 (wage-employed) and regression 10 (unemployed) there are some 
interesting results. For all education categories the reservation wage of those in 
wage-employment is significantly higher than the base compared to the 
unemployed. For the unemployed only those with 6-9+, matric and matric+ 
show any significance of having a reservation wage higher than the base
30. Thus, 
the level of education completed is far more significant in separating out the 
difference in reservation wages amongst the wage-employed.  
 
In addition regression 6 shows that those in wage-employment take far greater 
cognisance of their own contribution to household income (their wage) rather 
than the level of household income without their contribution. On average a 
person who contributes 10% more too household income will have a reservation 
wage of 0.4% higher, whereas the coefficient on net household income is highly 
insignificant
31. This clearly indicates that those in wage-employment have little 
concern for possible subsistence requirements but report a reservation wage that 
reflects their labour market value. On the other hand household income is 
significant to unemployed people when measuring variation in their reservation 
wages as shown in regression 9 where an increase in household income of 10% 
leads to a rise in an unemployed person’s reservation wage of 0.4%. 
 
In summary, the difference in the co-efficient on the education variable for the 
wage-employed and the unemployed indicates the difference in importance 
attached to education as an explanation of variation in the reservation wage of 
                                                           
29 Significant at the 10% level and becomes significant at the 5% level when ‘numploy’ is 
dropped from the regression. 
30 The reason why the university coefficient is insignificant is probably as a result of the small 
sample of only 4 unemployed people who have a university degree. 
31 An outlier with a total household monthly income of R60500 was dropped but this made no 
difference to the results.     
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the two groups. The effect of education is more pronounced and significant for 
those in wage-employment. In addition, wage-employed individuals place more 
significance on their own contribution to household income (i.e. what they are 
presently earning) rather than on household income minus their contribution. 
Alternatively, the level of household income has a significant impact on the 
reservation wage of unemployed individuals. This difference between the groups 
is clear evidence that unemployed individuals take greater cognisance of 
subsistence requirements than wage-employed individuals when reporting their 
reservation wage. Wage-employed people are far more concerned with their 
labour-market value than the unemployed when reporting reservation wages.  
 
Looking specifically at all unemployed
32 individuals in regression 11, an 
assessment is made of the effect of unemployment duration on a person’s 
reservation wage. As discussed, a negative relationship between duration of 
unemployment and a person’s reservation wage is expected in KMP. Regression 
11
33 shows that this is true for unemployment duration of up to 2 years - 
thereafter the results are not as significant. On average, a person who is 
unemployed for 6 months to a year will have a reservation wage of 18% less 
than a person who has been unemployed for less than 6 months. The reservation 
wage of someone drops on average by 19% if they are unemployed for a year to 
two years as compared to someone who has been unemployed for less than 6 
months. The results are not significant for those who have been unemployed for 
more than 2 years, possibly because these people have been out of the labour 
market for so long that they have lost touch with what they could realistically 
expect to earn given their characteristics. As a result, the reservation wage they 
are reporting is likely to be random and relatively meaningless. 
 
Table 10 showed evidence that the median reservation wage of those who have 
worked before is higher than the median reservation wage of those who have 
never had a job. This is not supported in regression 12 where the ‘work’ 
coefficient is insignificant.  However, in regression 14 where only the 
marginally unemployed are included, the coefficient on work is significant and 
shows that those who have worked report a reservation wage of 19% higher than 
                                                           
32 I tried running separate regressions (not shown) for those defined as narrowly employed 
but the general results were the same as that for the unemployed as a group. The only 
difference (as discussed) is the significance of the ‘work’ variable for the marginalised 
unemployed.   
33 Duration of unemployment is in no way linked to labour market status of the individual (i.e. 
it was found that a consistent amount of searching-unemployed fall into each category of 
unemployment duration - this holds for the network-searching and the marginalised 
unemployed).  
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those who have never worked
34. This significance can probably be ascribed to 
the fact that those who are marginalised unemployed have less contact with the 
labour market and can only truly judge their reservation wage according to what 
they had received when working previously. Those with previous work 
experience probably feel they can command a higher wage than those who have 
never worked. 
 
Finally, expectations on getting a job were introduced to see if they supported 
the evidence found in regression 4 where those who are more discouraged have 
a lower reservation wage. Regression 13 shows that no significant difference in 
reservation wage is explained by the difference between those who are positive 
and those who are disheartened about their job prospects. Even when a dummy 
variable was used to try and distinguish the very positive from the very 
disheartened there was no significant difference in reservation wage.   
 
Using White’s test, all regression equations were tested to see whether 
heteroskedasticity existed. In addition, those regressions including measures of 
household income were tested for heteroskedasticity by plotting the household 
income variable against the residuals. No sign of heteroskedasticity was found. 
 
In summary, although the R-squared value of the regressions is low, there are 
some interesting findings worth noting:  
 
Firstly, gender and race consistently show significance in explaining variation 
in reservation wages. Males have higher reservation wages than Females and 
Coloureds have higher reservation wages than Africans.  
 
The effect of age seems to vary, but in general older people have higher 
reservation wages. As age is not always significant – we cannot be exactly sure 
what the link is between age and reservation wages. It may proxy to an extent 
for life or work experience with older people thinking they can offer more to a 
job and as a result expecting to be remunerated better. In addition or 
alternatively, older people may want to be remunerated better in order to 
maximise on their final years in the labour force. 
 
An important finding is that any form of post-school education leads to a 
sudden increase in a person’s reservation wage even if they have had little or no 
schooling.  
                                                           
34 One will note that the coefficient on the hhold income variable becomes slightly less 
significant at only the 10% level. This may be as a result of correlation between hhold income 
and the work dummy. Those who have worked before come from wealthier households than 
those who have never worked.  
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A person’s reservation wage varies according to his/her labour market 
classification, with those in wage-employment leaning more towards a 
perceived labour market value reservation wage and those who are unemployed 
more towards a subsistence reservation wage. In addition, as people become 
more discouraged about their job prospects, their reservation wage declines. 
 
Disaggregating household income to isolate the separate effects of wage, self-
employment, casual-employment, grant and remittance income on the 
reservation wages of the unemployed showed no significant results. 
 
Although  duration of unemployment is not linked to labour market 
classification of the unemployed, there is evidence that as duration of 
unemployment lengthens (up to a point), so the reservation wage declines. 
Beyond this point, people have been unemployed for so long that the reservation 
wage they report is probably random and meaningless.  
 
Finally, a person’s reservation wage varies according to his/her background 
(urban/rural) only because a higher proportion of Africans are from rural areas 
and most of the Coloureds from urban areas. 
 
Now that we know the unemployed have the lowest reservation wage – one may 
wonder why it is that they are unemployed? Are they voluntarily choosing to 
remain unemployed due to optimistic wage aspirations given their level of skills, 
or are they not being employed, as they are too expensive relative to the wage 
they could command in the workplace and relative to those who are in wage-
employment? In order to answer these questions, section 6 will look at a 
respondent’s reservation wage in relation to their predicted wage. As discussed 
in section 3, Kingdon and Knight (2001) use a similar technique in trying to 
assess whether the unemployed are voluntarily unemployed. 
 
 
6. Reservation and Predicted Wages 
 
The first step is to generate a predicted wage for all respondents. From this, the 
ratio of reservation wage divided by predicted wage (RW/PW) is calculated (for 
all respondents who reported a reservation wage) to assess which groups of 
people have unrealistic wage expectations. Unrealistic wage expectations are 
where the ratio of RW/PW is greater than one meaning a higher reservation 
wage than predicted wage. To better understand which groups of people are 
most likely to have unrealistic wage expectations, an ordinal variable is created. 
Respondents are then given the value 1 if their ratio RW/PW is greater than 1 or  
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the value 0 if their ratio RW/PW is less than or equal to 1. Using probit analysis 
an assessment is made to see which groups of people have the highest chance of 
having a RW/PW ratio of greater than 1. The methodology is discussed briefly 





The same monthly after-tax wage that was calculated in section 4.3.1 for those 
in wage-employment is used. Non-labour force participants are rejected from 
this analysis. All those in self/casual-employment, searching/network-searching 
and marginalised unemployment are given a monthly after-tax wage equal to 0. 
If OLS regression were used to fit an earnings function for current wage earners 
and the fitted parameters used to predict what the unemployed would earn if 
they were employed this would lead to sample selection bias. In this case the 
OLS estimator is both biased and inconsistent (Breen, 1996). To reduce this 
selectivity bias, the Heckman maximum likelihood method of estimation is used 
to generate the respondents’ predicted wage
35. The maximum likelihood method 
is preferred to the Heckman two-step approach as the estimates are more 
efficient than the two-stage estimator and are asymptotically unbiased given a 
large enough sample (Breen, 1996). In this case the sample (N=1935) is large 
enough.  
 
Initially a probit model is run to explain which respondents would be employed 
given certain characteristics. The explanatory variables that will determine the 
probability of a person being selected into wage-employment are age, gender, 
education level, household status
36 and the number of other employed people in 
the household as shown in table 13. The use of networks is the main way people 
find jobs in KMP (Seekings, 2003). Number of other employed people in the 
household will increase the size of a person’s network and improve their 
chances of finding employment. Surprisingly, race is not significant in 
influencing a person’s probability of getting into wage-employment however, as 
shown in the outcome stage it is significant in determining variation in wages.  
 
                                                           
35 The Heckman maximum likelihood method was used instead of a standard Tobit as 
different explanatory variables could be used at the selection and outcome stage. A 
weakness of the standard Tobit model is that the same set of variables is held to determine 
both the probability of truncation and the expected value of the realised dependant variable, 
conditional on it having been observed. 
36 Either head of the household or not.  
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Table 13. Heckman maximum likelihood equation 
 
Dependant Variable: ln(wage) 
Selection Stage 
Intercept  -3.267*** 
[0.219] 
Age   0.016*** 
[0.004] 
Gender   0.301*** 
[0.079] 
Education  0.042*** 
[0.012] 
Head   0.948*** 
[0.093] 






Intercept  6.136*** 
[0.222] 
Age  0.007** 
[0.003] 
Gender  0.382*** 
[0.062] 
Race  0.229*** 
[0.058] 
Education  0.069*** 
[0.01] 
Lambda  -0.205** 
[0.104] 
N 1935 
Wald chi2(4)  90.74 
Prob>chi2 0.000 
 
Note:  Numbers in [ ] are the standard error 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
Once the likelihood function is specified, the process seeks to find a set of 
parameters that maximises the likelihood function and explains the predicted 
wage of each respondent. The explanatory variables, age and education
37, 
chosen for the outcome stage, confirm with a Mincerean earnings function (see 
                                                           
37 Age-squared and education-squared were also included but showed no significance.  
  47
Chamberlain & Van der Berg (2002) for a complete discussion). Age being used 
to proxy for work experience given the discussion earlier on the difficulties in 
measuring work experience in KMP. Finally, gender and race discrimination 
exist in the KMP labour market and are included as explanatory variables. A 
likelihood ratio test produced a chi-squared statistic of 3.94. Thus, at the 5% 
level one is able to reject the hypothesis that the selection and outcome stages 
are independent. This supports the use of the Heckman approach in generating 
the predicted wage. Predicted wages were generated for all respondents (using 
the model in table 13) including those presently in wage-employment. The 
predicted wages were adjusted by the inverse mills ratio (lambda), to account for 
the probability of the person getting the job. As shown in table 13 the variable 
lambda is included as one of the explanatory variables in the outcome stage and 





Table 14 shows the mean reservation wage, mean predicted wage, and the 
calculated RW/PW ratio for selected groups. Across all groups the ratio 
(RW/PW) is below one
38. The fact that RW/PW is below one is evidence that 
people in KMP are realistic in their wage expectations given what they could 
expect to earn in employment.  
 
To make a case for voluntary unemployment the ratio for those in 
unemployment would have to be one or above. The ratios for those in different 
labour market classifications show that this is far from the case. As people 
become more discouraged their ratio drops with those who are marginalised and 
network-searching having ratios of only 0.78 and 0.76 respectively. Such a low 
reservation wage relative to their predicted wage indicates their desperation to 
find employment. Even the unemployed who have never worked have a mean 
reservation wage well below their mean predicted wage.  
 
Looking at duration of unemployment, the results support the desperation of 
the unemployed to find work. As duration of unemployment lengthens beyond 6 
months, so the ratio falls from 0.83 to around 0.75. Those who have been 
unemployed for more than 8 years have a higher mean reservation wage as a 
group but also the lowest mean predicted wage. 
 
 
                                                           
38 The only exception is the 0-5+ education category.  
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Table 14.  Mean reservation wage (RW) and predicted wage (PW) 
 
  RW PW  Ratio  (RW/PW)
Female 1046  1153  0.91 
Gender 
Male 1267  1649  0.77 
African 1033  1245  0.83 
Race 
Coloured 1416  1701  0.83 
0-5 1023  1090  0.94 
0-5+ 1354  1327  1.02 
6-9 1077  1388  0.78 
6-9+ 1327  1615  0.82 
Matric 1209  1589  0.76 
Matric+ 1533  1826  0.84 
Education 
University 1490  2013  0.74 
Young (<=30)  1078  1360  0.79 
Age 
Old (>=30)  1189  1371  0.87 
Worked 1208  1431  0.84 
Work Experience 
Never Worked  963  1196  0.81 
Rural 1013  1235  0.82 
Background 
Urban 1262  1507  0.84 
Wage-emp 1319  1514  0.87 
Self-emp 1214  1241  0.98 
Casual-emp 1024  1301  0.79 
Searching-unemp 1066  1340  0.80 
Network Search-unemp  957  1267  0.76 
Labour Market Status 
Marginalised-unemp 944  1204  0.78 
Unemployed 
0-6 1149  1380  0.83 
6-12 957  1296  0.74 
12-24 934  1295  0.72 
24-48 991  1267  0.78 
48-96 926  1211  0.76 
Duration of Unemployment 
>96 1096  1189  0.92 
Worked before  1060  1335  0.79 
Work Experience 
Never Worked  936  1211  0.77 
 
As a result the ratio moves up to about 0.92. This supports the proposition that 
people lose their sense of market value after long spells of unemployment. 
 
In general the ratio RW/PW falls as education increases. Firstly, this indicates 
that those with little education have reservation wages that are possibly too high, 
especially the 0-5+ category. Secondly, it indicates that the better educated are 
being extremely well remunerated (high predicted wages) - those with university  
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qualifications having the lowest ratio of all categories at 0.74. The mean 
predicted wage of the different education categories supports the ‘convex returns 
to education in South Africa’ hypothesis. Those with some form of post-school 
education have a far higher mean predicted wage than those with no post-school 
education but comparable schooling (i.e. 0-5 have a mean PW of R1090, 
whereas 0-5+ have a mean PW of R1327). However, as noted in section 5, these 
groups are possibly aware of this return and have higher reservation wages. The 
ratio of RW/PW supports this with each category of post-school education 
having a higher ratio than those with comparable schooling but no post-school 
education.  
 
Of all the respondents, 28% had a reservation wage above their predicted wage. 
Probit analysis is used to understand what groups of people are most likely to be 
a part of this 28%. Table 15 shows the results for four different probit models. 
As discussed the dependant variable is ordinal, where 1 indicates that the 
respondent has a reservation wage higher than their predicted wage (i.e. group-
1) and 0 indicates that the respondent has a reservation wage equal to or less 




Table 15.  Probit analysis 
 
Dependant Variable: (1 if RW/PW>1) & (0 if RW/PW<=1) 
  1  2 3 4 
































Education  -0.028*** 





















                                                           
39 The coefficients on ‘age’ and ‘educ’ indicate the change in the probability of being in group-
1 for an infinitesimal change in the variable, extrapolated out (Stata Corporation, 2003). The 
rest of the variables are dummy variables and the coefficients indicate the change in the 
probability of being in group-1 given the dummy variable is opposite from the base. For 
example, in probit 1 the probability of being in group-1 for males is 11.8% less than for 
females.  
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Table 15. Probit analysis continued… 
 
Dependant Variable: (1 if RW/PW>1) & (0 if RW/PW<=1) 
  1  2 3 4 
0-5+   0.061 
[0.078]    
6-9   -0.152*** 
[0.025]    
6-9+   -0.122** 
[0.035]    
Matric   -0.157*** 
[0.028]    
Matric+   -0.112** 
[0.035]    
University   -0.227** 
[0.049]    
Self-emp     0.059 
[0.044]   
Casual-emp     -0.100* 
[0.05]   
Searching-unemp     -0.047 
[0.03]   
Network Search-unemp      -0.110** 
[0.033]   
Marginalised-unemp    -0.106*** 
[0.03]   
Unemp btw 6-12 months        -0.124** 
[0.035] 
Unemp btw 12-24 months        -0.122** 
[0.035] 
Unemp btw 24-48 months        -0.114** 
[0.036] 
Unemp btw 48-96 months        -0.129** 
[0.035] 
Unemp greater than 8 years        -0.077 
[0.044] 
N 1714  1714  1714  936 
LogL  -958.39  -963.75 -945.06 -461.60 
LR  chi2  94.90 84.18 121.55 90.47 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note:  Probit 4 includes only those who are classified in one of the unemployment categories 
Numbers in [ ] are the standard error 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 




Looking at probit 1, the coefficients on age and race are completely 
insignificant. From this result one can comment that the reason for a greater 
percentage of younger and African people being unemployed is not as a result of 
them having too high a reservation wage relative to what they could expect to 
earn.  
 
The work variable may show significance in probit 1, but as soon as labour 
market status is introduced in probit 3 it loses its significance. The ‘work’ 
variable shows no significance in probit 4
40 supporting the evidence from table 
14, where those unemployed who have never worked have a similar RW/PW 
ratio to those who have worked before. 
 
The gender variable is highly significant in all of the probit’s indicating that 
males have about a 12% less chance of being in group-1
41. Although one may 
argue that the higher proportion of women in unemployment in KMP is as a 
result of females having wage aspirations too high relative to what they could 
expect to earn in employment, table 14 shows that this is not the case. In table 
14 the ratio of RW/PW for women is below 1. The gender bias in the KMP 
labour market, with males being paid more than females for similar jobs, is the 
reason why the chances of males being in group-1 is less than that of females. 
 
The coefficient for education is highly significant, indicating that the chances of 
a person falling in group-1 declines as they become more educated. For low 
levels of education there may be a case that people have wage aspirations too 
high relative to what they could expect to earn. However, in general the 
explanation of the education coefficient is as a result of the very high 
remuneration of those with more education - remuneration well beyond their 
reservation wages. Probit 2 supports this, indicating that those with a university 
qualification have a 23% less chance of being in group-1 compared to those with 
an education level of only zero to standard 5. 
 
The results in probits 3 and 4 support those from table 14. Voluntary 
unemployment does not exist in KMP. Those who are network searching or 
marginally unemployed have an 11% less chance of being in group-1 and those 
who have been unemployed for longer than 6 months have about a 12% less 
chance of being in group-1. These results are due to the extremely low 
reservation wages of these groups - reservation wages driven by their 
desperation to find work. 
 
                                                           
40 Even when duration of unemployment is left out. 
41 For the unemployed, males have a 17% less chance of being in group-1 than females.  
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The results in this section indicate that unemployment is definitely not 
voluntary, as peoples’ reservation wages are realistic given what they could 
expect to earn in the labour market. The reservation wages of those who are 
unemployed (less educated, predominantly females and African) fall below their 
predicted wages. This substantiates other findings about the South African 
labour market (Bhorat & Hodge (1999), Bhorat (2000a), Edwards (2001), Fallon 
& Lucas (1998) and McCord (2002)) that there is a crucial need to create jobs 





In a country where unemployment is low, and where there are a sufficient 
number of job vacancies, knowing the determinants of reservation wages may be 
useful for explaining whether relatively high reservation wages are reducing the 
supply of labour. However, in South Africa the problem in the labour market is 
rather inadequate demand for unskilled labour. In an area like KMP, where 46% 
of the economically active respondents are classified as searching, network-
searching or marginalised unemployed, this amounts to a substantial portion of 
the population. With this in mind one may wonder what use reservation wage 
information can be.  
 
When presented with hypothetical job offers, as discussed in section 4, certain 
respondents refused jobs. This is significant (given the high levels off 
unemployment) as it signals that some people are not willing to accept a job at 
any wage. In light of this, knowing the determinants of reservation wages in 
KMP increases the understanding of labour supply – in particular which groups 
of people would be prepared to work at different wage rates.  
 
An important finding of this paper is that a person’s reservation wage is 
influenced strongly by his/her labour market status. There is no evidence that 
labour market status is a function of reservation wages (i.e. the unemployed do 
not have excessive or unrealistic wage aspirations). It was argued that the 
employed report a reservation wage based more on their perceived labour 
market value and the unemployed report a reservation wage influenced strongly 
by subsistence requirements.  
 
The paper showed that there is no evidence that the unemployed are out of work 
due to excessive wage aspirations, in relation to the wage they could command 
in employment. Section 6 shows that those who are deeper in unemployment 
(i.e. more discouraged) have the lowest RW/PW ratio and are least likely to  
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have a reservation wage above their predicted wage. In addition, as 
unemployment lengthens beyond 6 months, the RW/PW ratio falls accordingly. 
This indicates that people are responding rationally to the adverse labour market 
conditions. Unemployment is a result of the low availability of jobs for unskilled 
people rather than unrealistic wage expectations.  
 
It is accepted that there is a shortage of skills in the economy and improving the 
skill level is advantageous, but generating a more skilled workforce takes time. 
One way to create jobs for those with low skills, especially in KMP, is through 
Public Works Programmes
42 (PWPs). At present, the primary aim of a PWP in 
South Africa is to alleviate poverty (see McCord, 2002). A key determinant of 
the targeting success of such a programme (i.e. employing those from the 
poorest households) is setting the PWP wage at the correct level. If the wage is 
set too high then the PWP may attract people who are better off and already 
have jobs, leaving the poorest people without work. As a result many of the 
people in deepest poverty may not have their lives improved from the PWP (see 
Ravallion, Datt & Chaudhuri (1991) for evidence of this). On the other hand if 
the wage is set too low this may be morally problematic. However, if policy 
makers have a better understanding of reservation wages amongst different 
individuals, they may be able to set a wage rate, where only workers from the 
poorest households are attracted, and thus the poverty alleviation impact will be 
at its best.  
 
Table 16
43 shows a list of PWPs in the Western Cape between 1994 and 1998 
(Adato et al, 1999). It is unclear whether the work offered by these PWPs is 
casual or permanent employment. As discussed in section 3 and 4, people have a 
higher reservation wage for casual work than for permanent work. Section 4 
shows the mean reservation wage for casual work to be about double that of 
permanent work.
44 This should be taken into account when comparing the wage 
offered by PWPs and mean reservation wages. The numbers in brackets, in the 
bottom half of table 16, are the mean reservation wages multiplied by 2.  
 
                                                           
42 McCord (2002) offers a good overview of PWP and their poverty alleviation response. 
43 The top half of the table shows the PWP and the monthly wage offered. The information for 
the wage offered is taken from Adato et al (1999). In working out the monthly wage offered, 
the percentage of costs going to labour per day were converted to a monthly wage offer by 
multiplying the daily rate by 21.75. These monthly offers were then converted to 2000 figures 
using the CPI for metropolitan areas (South African Reserve Bank, 2001). 1996 was 
assumed to be the year of the PWP. The bottom half shows the mean reservation wage of 
different labour market groups.  
44 Table 2 shows the mean reservation wage for casual work (question I5) to be R2319 and 
the mean reservation wage for permanent work (question K5) to be R1159.  
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Ideally these PWP wages should be compared with reservation wages of people 
in the catchment area of the relevant PWP. However, in the absence of adequate 
data, the KMP survey is the best available proxy for comparison. 
 
Table 16. Wages in PWPs compared to mean reservation wages 
 
Programme  Monthly Wage Offered (rands) 
Transport 2306 
Comm-Based PWP  1229 
Cleaning and Greening  1111 
WCEDF-NEForum 924 
PILOT-Nat Dept PW  833 
FWCP-Working for Water  817 
Comm-Based PWP-CEP/I  600 
Labour Market Group  Mean Reservation Wage (rands) 
Wage-emp 1355  (2710) 
Self-emp 1214  (2428) 
Casual-emp 1024  (2048) 
Searching-unemp 1066  (2132) 
Network Search-unemp  957 (1914) 
Marginalised-unemp 944  (1888) 
Non-labour force participants  1272 (2544) 
Note:  Numbers in brackets are the reservation wages multiplied by 2. 
 
 
If we assume the PWP is a permanent job, then the ‘Transport’ PWP has a 
wage-offer higher than the mean reservation wage of both the wage-employed 
and the self-employed. A wage-offer this high may well distort the targeting 
effectiveness of the PWP (in trying to alleviate poverty amongst the 
unemployed) as those in wage-employment and self-employment may be 
attracted to the ‘Transport’ PWP. Only the four PWPs offering the lowest wages 
will be effective in targeting those who are unemployed and in most need of a 
job. However, a wage of R600/month for the ‘Comm-Based PWP-CEP/1’ 
programme is well below the reservation wage of even the marginalised 
unemployed.  
 
If we assume the PWP is a casual job, the story is quite different. No PWP 
would attract people in wage-employment or self-employment as the wages 
offered are below the reservation wages of the wage-employed and self-
employed for casual jobs (i.e. numbers in brackets). The ‘Transport’ PWP 
offering an adjusted monthly wage of R2306 would possibly attract people in 
casual-employment. All other PWPs would attract only unemployed people.  
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However, the wages offered in all PWPs, besides the ‘Transport’ PWP, are well 
below the reservation wage of even the marginalised unemployed (R1888) for 
casual work. 
 
As shown, in judging the targeting success of a PWP it is important to know 
whether permanent or casual-employment is being offered, as people have 
different reservation wages for permanent and casual-employment. Reservation 
wage information for different labour market groups in KMP could help policy 
makers better structure the wage offer of future PWPs for the KMP area. For 
example, in targeting those who are marginalised unemployed and come from 
the poorest households, a monthly wage of about R950 should be offered, 
assuming the PWP is offering a permanent position.   
 
The results in this paper show that those willing to accept the lowest wages are 
those with the least education and labour market experience and who come from 
households with no other wage earners. Hence, it is not necessarily in the 
interests of business to try and target those workers with the lowest reservation 
wages, in order to reduce labour costs. Having minimal experience of the labour 
market these people may have little idea of what it means to be at work on time 
or how the workday is structured and as a result will almost certainly be less 
productive.  
 
From a policy perspective the results of this paper have relevance in three areas: 
education, measures of poverty and lowering wages to reduce unemployment: 
 
Section 6 shows evidence of the premium attached to a person’s predicted wage 
as a result of post-school training. This premium is as a result of the present 
shortage of skilled labour. However, as the skill base is extended and reservation 
wages rise, the ratio (RW/PW) may rise above 1 (section 5 shows how post-
school education causes a sudden increase in reservation wages) and labour 
costs will increase. With this in mind, technical training or courses for the 
unemployed must be carefully prepared so that they equip the participants with 
sufficient knowledge/expertise/productivity changes to match the increased 
reservation wage or labour cost. Participants on such courses should also be 
given information about possible jobs and wages – in order to prevent those 
developing unrealistically high reservation wages.  
 
Perhaps greater focus should fall on the expansion of primary and secondary 
schooling, instead of tertiary level education, as reservation wages do not 
increase drastically for each standard completed. Primary and secondary 
schooling broadens the base of people with sufficient education to benefit from 
on the job training. Thus employers will receive workers with lower reservation  
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wages but with greater potential to benefit from on the job training. Employers 
will be able to equip workers with job specific skills that can be directly 
rewarded maintaining a cost/productivity balance. 
 
The results in section 5 show a tendency for unemployed people to take 
subsistence requirements into account when reporting their reservation wage. 
The mean reservation wage for unemployed people in KMP is about R1000 per 
month, which may in fact be a further and more accurate measure of a subjective 
poverty line. In future surveys, greater effort must be made at the level of survey 
design to distinguish adequately between those who report reservation wages as 
subsistence reservation wages (i.e. take household income into account) and 
those who just report their perceived labour market value. This paper has 
highlighted the fact that wage earners probably do not omit their contribution to 
household income when reporting their reservation wage.   
 
The problem of adverse selection exists in labour contracts where the employer 
cannot completely distinguish between the productivity of a group of 
prospective employees. One way to ensure that more productive employees are 
attracted hired and retained is to offer higher wages or what are termed 
efficiency wages. A recent article by Fedderke (2003) suggests that dropping 
wages in South Africa will reduce unemployment. Evidence from this paper 
both supports and cautions Fedderke’s reasoning in light of adverse selection. In 
supporting Fedderke’s argument, section 6 shows how low the RW/PW ratio is 
for different groups of workers in KMP, but especially those with better 
qualifications. There is thus room for employers to reduce wages and still 
attract, hire and retain productive workers. In turn, lowering wages will possibly 
allow employers to hire greater numbers of workers - helping ease 
unemployment as argued by Fedderke (2003). In cautioning Fedderke’s (2003) 
argument, it must be noted that different categories of labour have different 
reservation wages. If wages are dropped substantially then only those who are 
poorly educated and marginalised unemployed (i.e. less productive) will be 
attracted to work and those who have better education and experience will 
withdraw from the labour force. In this instance the unemployment rate may fall 
as less productive workers take jobs and more productive workers withdraw 
from the labour force. However, this fall in unemployment may not be 
permanent. On one hand, the average productivity of labour will have declined, 
leading to a drop in output, lower growth and less job opportunities. On the 
other hand, as more productive workers stay out of the labour force (duration 
without work increases) so will their reservation wage decline, as their human 
capital depreciates. At some point their reservation wage will fall low enough 
and they will re-enter the labour market as less productive workers. On re-
entering the labour market the unemployment rate will increase once more.   
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Given the limited knowledge of reservation wages, qualitative research is 
necessary to better understand what people think when asked about their 
reservation wage. A complete understanding of how reservation wages change 
over time, how people re-evaluate themselves and the rate of this re-evaluation, 
will only be possible when panel data exists. The present minimum wage 
legislation and changes to the legislation will impact on a person’s reservation 
wage especially if it falls below the minimum wage. When panel data exists this 
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K.5. What is the absolute lowest monthly take home wage you would work for?
Appendix A: Histogram of Reservation Wages and 
Treatment of Outliers 
 
Four respondents reported 
a reservation wage of 
above R6500 per month. 
These responses are more 
than two standard 
deviations above the mean 
reservation wage of 
R1159 per month and 
were investigated more 
carefully to consider 
whether they were outliers 
and in need of adjustment. 
Of these four responses, 
two were for respondents 
who are classified as being in wage-employment, reporting a monthly wage of 
R600 and R5500, well below their reported reservation wages of R8000 and 
R9500 respectively. Both these observations were coded as missing as they are 
well above what the respondent is presently earning and are taken to be 
recording errors.  
 
A further respondent, classified as being marginalised unemployed, reported a 
reservation wage of R8000, well above the wage of R736 earned by this person 
in their first and only job in 1996. Accordingly, this observation was coded as 
missing as it is also taken to be a recording error. The fourth response of R7000 
is the reported reservation wage of a school-going 21 year old. It was decided 
not to code this observation as missing as R7000 may be the person’s 
reservation wage to drop out of school and forgo completing matric. Setting the 
three observations to missing reduces the mean and standard deviation only 
slightly as shown in the table below. 
 




  Obs. Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Before 2267  1159  798 
After 2264  1149  752 
 
                                                           
45 Total sample before dropping those too old etc. from the regression analysis.  
  63
Appendix B: Explanatory Variables Not Used 
 
 
The following variables were not used in the analysis in this paper but could be 
used in a national sample. 
 
Rural/Urban area of residence may be an important factor in explaining 
variation in reservation wages if respondents come from both rural and urban 
areas. In this study all people lived in the KMP area and were classified as urban 
dwellers. 
 
In an area of high unemployment, one would expect people to have lower 
reservation wages than in an area of low unemployment, as the probability of 
finding work is lower. The local unemployment rate subtracted from one would 
be a good proxy for the probability of finding a job in a certain area. It would 
be useful to test the relationship between reservation wages and the local 
unemployment rate for areas that have differences in unemployment, but within 
KMP people face the same unemployment rate. 
 
When looking at what determines an individual’s reservation wage, the type of 
job and industry should be taken into account. There are two reasons why this 
is not taken into account in this study. The first is that no industry specific 
reservation wage information was asked of the respondents. The KMP survey 
was undertaken in an area of very high unemployment (according to the labour 
market classifications adopted, 46% of the economically active
46 respondents 
were classified as either searching, network-searching or marginalised 
unemployed) with the purpose of probing the minimum wage that a respondent 
would accept for ‘any job’. The expectation is that respondents are so desperate 
for work, given the high levels of unemployment that they will accept whatever 
job is offered. The second reason is that this paper seeks to understand what 
impacts on a person’s reservation wage in an area of high unemployment before 
any specific job offers are evaluated.  
 
Factors like distance to work and working conditions would be important in 
determining a person’s reservation wage if he/she were presently working
47 or 
had received a specific job offer. As we are interested in reservation wages prior 
to any offers having been received these factors are not considered.  
                                                           
46 Here, economically active does not include those classified as non-labour force 
participants.  
47 If working conditions are improved or the job is brought closer to home then the person 
may be prepared to work for less.  
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Another factor considered are the costs of job search. According to the value 
functions described in section 2,if the costs of search go up then the value of 
being searching unemployed will fall. If this value falls then the value of 
employment (a wage offer) need not be as high in order to induce a person to 
take the job. Thus one would expect a negative relationship between costs of 
search and a person’s reservation wage. If more specific questions had been 
asked in the KMP survey this would be an interesting relationship to test. 
However, only a question relating to the costs of travel was asked and very little 
variation in response was recorded (the mean being R25 per month with a 
standard deviation of R113). In addition, it is believed that non-work income 
available to the respondent is more important as an explanatory variable than the 
cost of search in explaining variation in reservation wages – especially if we 
assume that the costs of job search are the same for people in KMP. The expense 
of job search is then relative to the amount of non-wage income a person can 
rely on. If their non-wage income is high, then their costs of search will be 
relatively lower, than people with less non-wage income. Thus, as non-wage 
income is increased, costs of search will fall and the reservation wage will rise. 
Here, the reservation wage is positively related to non-wage income. This 
relationship is tested using data from the KMP survey. 
 
A further factor that was considered in determining an individual’s reservation 
wage is union membership. Mention of unions in the KMP questionnaire is 
only in question E19, which measures the deductions from a pay slip of a person 
in wage-employment. The mean reservation wage of those who indicated that 
they had union fees deducted from their payslip is R1521, which is substantially 
different from the mean of the sample as a whole of R1166 (table 10). However, 
this difference is better explained by the fact that all of these respondents who 
reported fees deducted from their payslip have answered section E, dealing with 
wage-employment, and are classified as being in wage-employment. The 
regression analysis will show that those in wage-employment have a 
significantly higher reservation wage as a group. 
 
Non-wage income also includes household savings that a household member is 
able to draw on. In trying to assess the effect of household savings on a 
respondent’s reservation wage, it is only possible to see if there is a difference 
between those people who are currently showing some form of savings activity 
(stokvel, burial society, bank or other) from those who are not.  In the KMP 
survey, respondents were asked to indicate the amount of money they give to a 
stokvel or burial society and the amount of money saved in the bank or other 
savings every month. The questions asked shed no light on the accumulated 
savings that a person is able to draw on. It would be incorrect to assume that just  
  65
because a person is saving a high amount per month now, that they have a good 
savings base on which to draw. The best we can do is to assess if there is any 
difference between the reservation wages of those who show savings activity 
and those who do not. Of the KMP respondents, just under half (47%) indicated 
some form of monthly saving activity. As can be seen in table 10, there is a 
difference in mean reservation wages between the two groups. Those who save 
have a higher mean reservation wage (R1223) than those who do not currently 
save (R1076). This result was tested in various regression models and found to 
be insignificant regardless of the specification of the model. Often the signs 
were different from what was expected.  
 
Household Size and number of children less than 16 in the household were 
considered in determining an individual’s reservation wage but no clear 
relationship was found, from both an analysis of the means (as per table 10) and 
including these variables in the regression analysis.                   
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Appendix C: Summary Statistics of Categorical 
Explanatory Variables (%breakdown) 
 
  Breakdown  % 
Male 43  Gender 
Female 57 
African 72  Race 
Coloured 28 
Married 41  Marital Status 
Unmarried 59 






Network Search-unemp  8 
Marginalised-unemp 16 
Labour Market Status 
Non-labour force participants  6 
Worked before  71  Work Experience 
Never Worked  29 
Very Positive  40 
Positive 25 
Neither Pos nor Dis  11 
Disheartened 10 
Expectations on getting a Job 
Very Disheartened  14 
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